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Comment
"DOWNSIZING" THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
ACT: THE AVAILABILITY OF DISPARATE IMPACT
LIABILITY
Since the passage of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 (ADEA),I age discrimination has progressively gained attention in
the courts and in the popular media.2 When an employer terminates or
fails to hire a worker who is over forty because of the employer's belief that
older workers are slower, more expensive or close-minded, the employer
commits an illegal act.3 The illegality of such an act is as clear as the ille-
1. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 621-634 (1994)).
2. See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EEOC's EXPANDING
WORKLOAD-INCREASES IN AGE DISCRIMINATION AND OTHER CHANGES CALL FOR A
NEW APPROACH 10 (1994). According to this report, in 1980, the first full year for
which the EEOC had enforcement authority for the ADEA, there were 59,328
charges of discrimination filed; of these 11,076 (18.6%) were age discrimination
charges. Id. In 1986, a total of 68,222 charges were filed of which 17,443 (25.3%)
were age discrimination charges. Id. By 1992, 19,253 (27.4%) of a total of 70,339
charges were age discrimination charges. Id. In 1993, a total of 88,000 charges
were filed; 22.6% of these were age discrimination charges. Id.; see also The High
Cost of Age Discrimination, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 14, 1995, at B6 (finding
that "the federal age discrimination law is being invoked frequently these days in
response to corporate downsizing and other cost cutting moves"); Charles Strause,
More and More Seniors Challenging Employers Over Age Discrimination, MIAMI HERALD,
Mar. 12, 1995, at A16 (reporting that 1,700 age discrimination complaints were
filed with EEOC's Florida office in 1994, representing one-third increase since
1990).
Age discrimination and "ageism" are popular topics among legal scholars and
are a major part of the growing field of "elder law." See generally RICHARD A. Pos-
NER, AGING AND OLD AGE (1996) (analyzing legal issues relating to older persons);
Susan J. Hemp & Cheryl Rae Nyberg, Elder Law: A Guide to Key Resources, 3 ELDER
L.J. 1 (1995) (cataloguing thousands of books and articles written on legal issues
which affect elderly); Brian Raphael et al., Gerontology and the Law: A Selected Bibliog-
raphy 1991-94 Update, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 287 (1995) (same). Age discrimination is
also a common topic in the popular media. See, e.g., Vdayan Bupta, Age Discrimina-
tion Guidelines Adopted by New York City, WALL ST. J., Nov. 18, 1993, at B9 (reporting
on city regulations banning age discrimination in public accommodations);
Deborah Jacobs, Combat Age Discrimination with Updated Skill and Tact, BALTIMORE
SUN, July 9, 1995, at 4K (offering advice to older workers who are experiencing
employment discrimination); Carol Kleiman, Age Discrimination and Women Are Old,
Familiar Adversaries, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 24, 1995, at N3 (discussing particular
problems older female workers face); Perles is Suing Michigan State; Ex-Coach Report-
edly is Claiming Age Discrimination, STAR TRIB., Oct. 14, 1995, at 2C (reporting on
age discrimination suit filed by former football coach).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a). The ADEA states: "It shall be unlawful for an employer
... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual . . .because of such
individual's age ...." Id. § 623(a)(1). The statute requires employers to ignore
(1527)
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age when making employment decisions. See, e.g., Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507
U.S. 604, 611 (1993) (stating that employer who makes adverse employment deci-
sions on basis of age is liable under ADEA); Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472
U.S. 400, 422 (1985) (finding that "under the [ADEA], employers are to evaluate
employees between the ages of 40 and 70 on their merits and not on their age").
Plaintiffs who believe an employer intentionally disadvantaged them because of
their age must prove their case under the "disparate treatment" model, which was
developed in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and Texas Dep't
of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). For a discussion of the distinc-
tions between the "disparate treatment" and "disparate impact" theories of liability,
see infra notes 28-37 and accompanying text.
Older workers are stereotyped as close-minded, less productive, less adaptable
to new technology and ideas, slower, less physically active and more prone to sick-
ness. See, e.g., Lehman v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 74 F.3d 323, 330 (1st Cir.
1996) (describing meeting where consultant used handout that contrasted "Orga-
nizational Man" of "Ozzie and Harriet" generation who is pessimistic, cautious,
oriented to bureaucracies and has 30-year career plan with "New Manager" of
"Kuzak & Gracie of LA. Law" generation who is risk taker, optimistic, well-edu-
cated and hardworking); JACK LEVIN & WILLIAM C. LEVIN, AGEISM: PREJUDICE AND
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE ELDERLY 74-76 (1980) (discussing various ageist ste-
reotypes). Because most people will someday be in the protected group, the eld-
erly cannot be considered a "discrete and insular minorit[y]" in need of
"extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process." San Antonio
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). Decisions made on the basis of stereotypes, however,
damage older workers and society. See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 113-14 (1979)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Such generalizations stigmatize the aged as physically
and mentally deficient, regardless of their individual capabilities.... Particularly in
the area of employment, significant deprivations have been imposed on the basis
of these stereotypes.") (citing 29 U.S.C. § 621(a); HousE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
AGING, MANDATORY RETIREMENT: THE SOCIAL AND HUMAN COST OF ENFORCED IDLE-
NESS, 95th Cong., 35, 37 (1977); C. EDELMAN & I. SIEGLER, FEDERAL AGE DISCRIMINA-
TION IN EMPLOYMENT LAw 15-17 (1978); Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967, 90 HARV. L. REV. 380, 380-81, 383 (1976)).
While there is no question that a person's ability to perform their job will
eventually decline with age, empirical studies have shown that the assumption that
this decline starts somewhere around age 65 is far from accurate. See MARTIN LYON
LEVINE, AGE DISCRIMINATION AND THE MANDATORY RETIREMENT CONTROVERSY 108,
203 (1988) (citing MILDRED DOERING ET AL., THE AGING WORKER: RESEARCH AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (1983)) (discussing lack of evidence for widely held negative
belief about performance of older workers). The legislators who passed the ADEA
recognized that stereotyping of older workers is wrong. See 113 CONG. REC. 31,256
(statement of Sen. Young):
The view that a man or woman is so old at 65 as to warrant compul-
sory retirement from industry stems from an era before the turn of the
century and comes to us from a period when life expectancy was about
half of the life expectancy of Americans and Europeans at the present
time .... In fact, today [people] are not as old at 65 [in] thought, action,
physical and mental ability as men and women ... were at the age of 40 in
the 1880's. Yet, for some reason or other, we Americans have adhered to
this view of 65 as being the proper age for retirement notwithstanding the
fact that this concept is today as outdated as are flint-lock muskets and
candle dips of the eighteenth century.
Id.; see also 113 CONG. REc. 31,254 (statement of Sen. Javits) (stating that assump-
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gality of adverse employment decisions made on the basis of race or sex.4
Further, most people would agree that such an employment decision is
unjust.5 Conversely, when an employer, under economic pressure, de-
cides to lay off its highest paid workers or refuses to hire workers whose
experience commands a certain salary, it is more difficult to say that the
employer has done something wrong-legally or morally-even though
these decisions often disparately impact older workers.
6
The disparate impact theory was developed under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) 7 to combat practices by employers that
are facially neutral, but have a significant adverse impact on a protected
group.8 The ADEA was prompted by and modeled after Title VII, and the
two acts have traditionally been interpreted by reference to one another.9
It is clear that a plaintiff can use the disparate impact theory to prove
4. See generally Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976) (ob-
serving "that in enacting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress in-
tended to prohibit all practices in whatever form which create inequality in
employment opportunity due to discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex,
or national origin").
5. See, e.g., McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 883
(1995) (stating that "[tllhe ADEA... reflects a societal condemnation of invidious
bias in individual employment decisions"); cf Thornbrough v. Columbus & Green-
ville R.R., 760 F.2d 633, 637 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding that Congress's enactment of
ADEA was recognition that "one of the tests of a civilized society. is its treatment of
the elderly").
6. See, e.g., Armendariz v. Pinkerton Tobacco Co., 58 F.3d 144, 152 (5th Cir.
1995) (refusing to impose liability on employer who terminated salesman because
independent contractor was more efficient and stating: "[s]urely the ADEA does
not require that an employer prove that it is in fact losing money before it can take
a nondiscriminatory and legitimate course of action to make more."); EEOC v.
Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073 (7th Cir. 1994) (refusing to impose liability
on school district which refused to hire teachers with more than five years of expe-
rience because of budget constraints); Allen v. Diebold, Inc., 33 F.3d 674, 677 (6th
Cir. 1994) ("The ADEA was not intended to protect older workers from the often
harsh economic realities of common business decisions and the hardships associ-
ated with corporate reorganizations, downsizing, plant closings and relocations.");
see alsoJoseph Nocera, Living With Layoffs, FORTUNE, Apr. 1, 1996, at 69 (finding
that layoffs are incredibly painful to workers but are necessary response to compet-
itive world).
7. Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 241.253-66 (1964) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §2000e to 2000e-17 (1994).
8. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) (establishing
disparate impact theory). The disparate impact theory developed in response to
employment policies enacted shortly after the effective date of Title VII, which
appeared to have been enacted to avoid compliance with the statute. Id. For a
discussion of the development of the disparate impact theory and the Griggs case,
see infra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 755-58 (1979) (noting
that ADEA is modeled after Title VII, resulting in comparability of terms and
prohibitions); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1016-17 (1st Cir. 1979)
(same). For a discussion of the similariiies and parallel histories of the ADEA and
Title VII, see infra notes 38-70 and accompanying text.
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liability under Tide VIIO ° The courts have not adequately resolved, how-
ever, the question of whether a plaintiff can use disparate impact analysis
as a means of proving liability under the ADEA. 11
There are compelling policy arguments for and against disparate im-
pact liability in the age discrimination context. 12 As the baby-boomers
grow older, stories of middle-aged workers losing their jobs as a result of
"downsizing" are common-place.' 3 Advocates for older workers argue that
10. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (amending
Title VII to clarify availability of disparate impact under statute and to clarify meth-
ods and burdens of proof in disparate impact case). For a detailed discussion of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, see infra notes 84-95 and accompanying text. For a
detailed discussion of the litigation framework for disparate impact claims, see in-fta note 32 and accompanying text.
11. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993) ("[W]e have never
decided whether a disparate impact theory of liability is available under the ADEA
... and we need not do so here."). Uncertainty as to the availability of disparate
impact analysis in age cases has been recognized for some time. See Markham v.
Geller, 451 U.S. 945, 948 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certio-
rari) ("This Court has never held that proof of discriminatory impact can establish
a violation of the ADEA.").
12. For a discussion of the policy arguments for and against disparate impact
under the ADEA, see infra notes 14-16 and accompanying text. Policy arguments
are better left to Congress. For a discussion of a recommended legislative solution
to this issue, see infra notes 216-22 and accompanying text.
13. See Age Discrimination Hovers over Older Displaced Workers, CHi. TRIB., Nov.
20, 1995, at 5 (describing specific cases of workers over 40 being laid off and their
inability to find comparable employment); Michael Hammer, Who's to Blame for All
the Layoffs?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 1996, at A12 (discussing recent wave of layoffs);
Robert Lewis, 'Downsizing' Taking a Higher Toll, AARP BuLL., Nov. 1994, at 1 (dis-
cussing "massive" downsizing in recent years); Vivian Marino, For Middle-Aged Who
Lose Jobs, Labor Market Is Tough, LA. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1995, at D13 (same); Allan
Sloan, The Hit Men, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 26, 1996, at 44 (discussing recent mass layoffs
and CEOs who ordered them). But seeJoann S. Lublin, Corporate Survey Finds Fewer
Layoffs, Increase in New Jobs to Balance Cuts, WALL ST.J., Oct. 23, 1995, at A2 (finding
that businesses which participated in survey are laying off fewer people than in past
nine years and are creating almost as many new jobs as they are terminating);
Bernard Wysocki, Jr., The Outlook: Big Corporate Layoffs Are Slowing Down, WALL ST.
J., June 12, 1995, at Al (discussing slowdown in corporate restructuring and find-
ing that in first five months of 1995, U.S. companies eliminated 146,000jobs, down
45% from previous year).
Recently, The New York Times ran a series of articles entitled "The Downsizing
of America." On the basis of various polls, the Times found that in one-third of the
households surveyed, a family member had involuntarily left ajob since 1980, and
that 40% of the people surveyed knew a relative or friend who had been laid off.
See Louis Uchitelle & N.R. Kleinfield, On the Battlefields of Business, Millions of Casu-
alties, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1996, at Al (listing statistics and framing issues). After
analyzing statistics from the Department of Labor, the Times observed that while
unemployment is relatively low, 35% of those who lose their jobs must accept new
jobs at lower salaries and often in different fields. Id. The Times found that work-
ers with some college education are being laid off at a higher rate than workers
with no college education. Id. Further, workers with a salary above $50,000 have
recently had their jobs eliminated twice as often as they did in the 1980s. Id. The
Times noted that while two million people are victims of violent crime each year,
three million people are victims of layoffs. Id.; see also N.R. Kleinfield, In the Work-
place Musical Chairs: The Company as Family, No More, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1996, at Al
1530
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older workers need the protection the disparate impact theory provides. 14
Advocates for employers argue that the disparate impact analysis devel-
oped in cases involving race discrimination should not be "imported" into
the age discrimination context because age is different than race, gender
(discussing changes in employer-employee relationship in atmosphere of mergers
and changing employers); Rick Bragg, Big Holes Where the Dignity Used to Be, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 5, 1996, at Al (discussing psychological issues caused by layoffs); Rick
Bragg, More than Money, They Miss the Pride a Good Job Brought, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5,
1996, at A17 (discussing disillusion caused by layoffs); Sara Rimer, A Hometown Feels
Less Like Home, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1996, at 1 (discussing severe effects of downsiz-
ing on cities which were dependent on small number of large businesses and ex-
amining effect on Dayton, Ohio in particular); Kirk Johnson, In the Class of '70,
Wounded Winners, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. , 1996, at 1 (focusing on one college class
whose members are in their mid-forties and discussing their anxiety about eco-
nomic prospects, and fact that one of five lost their job in past fifteen years and
one-third have been involved in laying off other people); Elizabeth Kolbert &
Adam Clymer, The Politics of Layoffs: In Search of a Message, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1996,
at 1 (discussing importance of issue of job security in 1996 presidential election);
David E. Sanger & Steve Lohr, A Search for Answers to Avoid the Layoffs, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 9, 1996, at 1 (discussing alternatives to layoffs).
Fortune magazine also ran a series of articles discussing the reality of layoffs.
See Joseph Nocera, Living with Layoffs, FORTUNE, Apr. 1, 1996, at 69 (discussing
recent wave of layoffs); Ronald B. Lieber, How Safe Is Your Job?, FORTUNE, Apr. 1,
1996, at 72 (recommending ways to avoid and deal with layoffs); Brian O'Reilly,
Ma Bell's Orphans, FORTUNE, Apr. 1, 1996, at 88 (focusing on recently laid off AT&T
workers).
The American workforce is clearly getting older. See generally S. REP. No. 95-
493, at 4, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 504, 507 (discussing workforce
demographics); CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PROJECTIONS OF THE POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES: 1975
TO 2050, at 67 (Oct. 1975). Projected growth in the older population is expected
to raise the median age of the U.S. population to age 36 by the year 2000, to age 42
by the year 2030, and to age 43 by the year 2040. 1 HOWARD C. EGLIT, AGE Dis-
CRIMINATION 14 (2d ed. 1995).
This phenomenon has been referred to as the "age wavd' and the "senior boom."
See The Age Wave, TRAINING & DEV. J., Feb. 1990, at 22, 24 (coining term "age
wave"); Jeffrey L. Sheler, The Aging Worker: Asset and Liability, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., May 4, 1981, at 76 (describing "senior boom"). The growing proportion of
seniors is a result of a combination of factors: the age of the World War II baby
boom generation, improved medical procedures and lower birth rates among the
current childbearing-age generation. Id.
14. See, e.g., Steven J. Kaminshine, The Cost of Older Workers, Disparate Impact,
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 42 FLA. L. REv. 229, 234 (1990) (argu-
ing for courts to take "balanced" approach to age discrimination, which includes
recognition of disparate impact claims); Maria Ziegler, Disparate Impact Analysis and
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 68 MINN. L. REv. 1038, 1056-65 (1984) (ar-
guing that widespread discrimination against older workers because of stereotypes
justifies disparate impact age claims); cf. Julie R. Steiner, Comment, Age Classifica-
tions and the Fourteenth Amendment: Is the Murgia Standard Too Old to Stand ?, 6 SETON
HALL CONST. L.J. 263 (1995) (arguing that age should be treated as quasi-suspect
class subject to intermediate scrutiny in equal protection challenge).
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or national origin.15 These advocates argue that everyone gets older and
that there is, at some point, a correlation between age and ability.16
The statutory language and legislative history of the ADEA can be
used to support persuasive arguments for and against the availability of
disparate impact liability. 17 If the history and the language were the only
materials relevant to this question, there would be no clear answer.1 8 Two
15. See, e.g., Pamela S. Krop, Note, Age Discrimination and the Disparate Impact
Doctrine, 34 STAN. L. Rv. 837, 838 (1982) (arguing that disparate impact theory
should not apply in age cases because of fundamental differences between age and
race discrimination). For a further discussion of this argument, see infra notes 85-
88 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 2, at 319 (arguing that it is not necessarily
unjust to make employment decisions based on age). Judge Posner argues that
"[p] ractices that appear to discriminate against the elderly, such as mandatory re-
tirement at fixed ages or late vesting of pensions-practices that the law has taken
upon itself to change, though apparently with little effect-have strong efficiency
justifications and little or no tincture of injustice." Id. Judge Posner describes the
ADEA as "a particularly misbegotten venture in tilting at the windmills of ageism."
Id. Judge Posner states "there really is a process called aging ... generating palpa-
ble and occupationally relevant physical and mental differences between older and
younger persons." Id.; see also Alfred W. Blumrosen, Interpreting the ADEA: Intent or
Impact, in AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT: A COMPLIANCE AND LITIGATION
MANUAL FOR LAWYERS AND PERSONNEL PRACTITIONERS 68, 106-15 (1982) (arguing
that Secretary of Labor and legislators who drafted ADEA recognized difference
between age discrimination and other forms of discrimination and that they never
intended to authorize disparate impact liability); Donald R. Stacey, A Case Against
Extending the Adverse Impact Doctrine to ADEA, 10 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 437, 438-39
(1985) (arguing that because older persons are not discrete and insular minority
and because they have not been subjected to history of purposeful discrimination,
they are not entitled to "extraordinary protection" of adverse impact doctrine);
Evan H. Pontz, Comment, What a Difference ADEA Makes: Why Disparate Impact The-
oiy Should Not Apply to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 74 N.C. L. REv. 267
(1995) (arguing that disparate impact theory should not be applied because of
effect it would have on number of age discrimination claims).
In a perfect world, employees who wish to stay with an employer for their
entire career are afforded that opportunity. In that situation, the employer will
pay the employee less than deserved, based on their productivity, earlier in the
employee's career and more than deserved, later in their career when they are less
productive resulting in a fair wage over the employee's life cycle. See Edward P.
Lazear, Agency, Earnings Profiles, Productivity and Hours Restrictions, 71 Am. ECON.
REV. 606 (1981) (discussing wages over life cycle); Robert Hutchens, Delayed Pay-
ment Contracts and a Firm's Propensity to Hire Older Workers, 4J. LAB. ECON. 439 (1986)
(discussing wage-age system). Problems arise when these assumptions are applied
in today's labor market because employees rarely stay with the same employer over
their entire career.
17. Compare Kaminshine, supra note 14, at 286-306 (arguing that legislative
history and text support extension of disparate impact analysis to ADEA), with
Stacey, supra note 16, at 439-47 (arguing that legislative history and text evidence
congressional intent to prohibit only intentional discrimination, not disparate
impact).
18. See EEOC v. Governor Mifflin Sch. Dist., 623 F. Supp. 734, 740 (E.D. Pa.
1985) ("It is far from clear that Congress intended to limit the application of the
ADEA to cases of intentional discrimination."). Compare Geller v. Markham, 635
F.2d 1027, 1032 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that text and legislative history supported
extension of disparate impact to ADEA), with Markham v. Geller, 451 U.S. 945
6
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relatively recent developments, however, suggest that disparate impact lia-
bility is not available under the ADEA as currently written.
First, in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress amended Title VII to
make disparate impact analysis a part of the statutory scheme and to estab-
lish the methods for proving and defending a disparate impact claim.1 9
Congress did not similarly amend the ADEA. Second, in Hazen Paper Co. v.
Biggins,20 the Supreme Court held that when an employer makes an em-
ployment decision on the basis of factors other than age, there is no viola-
tion of the ADEA, even if those factors have a high correlation with age.2 '
While Hazen Paperwas a disparate treatment case, it has important implica-
tions for the disparate impact question.
Part I of this Comment discusses the history and policy underlying the
disparate impact theory.22 Part II reviews the legislative history and the
language of the ADEA and compares the statute to Title VII. 23 Part III of
this Comment discusses the significance of Congress's 1991 amendment of
Title VII and its silence with regard to the ADEA, and Part IV analyzes the
significance of the Hazen Paper decision. 24 Against this backdrop, Part V
analyzes the cases that have considered whether disparate impact claims
are cognizable under the ADEA in light of Hazen Paper.25 Part VI of this
Comment concludes that disparate impact is not available as a means of
proving liability under the ADEA, and that from a policy standpoint, this is
not a good result.2 6 Part VII of this Comment recommends that Congress
(1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (arguing that text and
history do not support extension of disparate impact to age claims).
19. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
20. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
21. Id. at 609 (holding that "there is no disparate treatment under the ADEA
when the factor motivating the employer is some feature other than the em-
ployee's age"); see also Patricia A. Mitchell, Note, Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins: Ex-
tending the Disparate Impact Doctrine to ADEA Claims, 29 GONZ. L. REv. 675 (1994)
(dicussing significance of Hazen Paper decision in detail).
The Hazen Paper Court refused to decide the question of the availability of
disparate impact analysis under the ADEA. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 609. For a
discussion of the Hazen Paper decision, see infra notes 117-28 and accompanying
text.
22. For a discussion of the disparate impact theory, see infra notes 28-37 and
accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of the legislative history of the ADEA, see infra notes 38-
57 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the language of the ADEA, see infra
notes 58-70 and accompanying text.
24. For a discussion of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, see infra notes 84-95 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the decisions which preceeded Hazen Pa-
per, see infra notes 97-116 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Hazen
Paper opinion, see infra notes 117-28. For a discussion of cases which have relied
on Hazen Paper for the proposition that disparate impact liability is not available
under the ADEA, see infra notes 151-75 and accompanying text.
25. For a survey of cases which have considered whether disparate impact is
available under the ADEA, see infra notes 129-94 and accompanying text.
26. For a detailed analysis of the availability of disparate impact under the
ADEA, see infra notes 195-215 and accompanying text.
1996] COMMENT 1533
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amend the ADEA and provide older workers with the protection that they
need in the current economy.2 7
I. THE DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY
Generally, a plaintiff may prove an employment discrimination claim
by showing either "disparate treatment" or "disparate impact. '28 In a dis-
parate treatment case, employees attempt to prove that their employer
treated them less favorably than other employees because of their age,
race, color, religion or other legally protected characteristic. 29 In a dispa-
rate treatment case, the plaintiff must prove that discriminatory animus
motivated the employer to make the adverse employment decision. 30 The
27. For a discussion of a proposed congressional amendment which would
make disparate impact a part of the ADEA, see infra notes 216-22 and accompany-
ing text.
28. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 609. For a further discussion of Hazen Paper, see
infra notes 117-28 and accompanying text. A plaintiff may plead both theories and
apply each to the same set of facts. Wright v. National Archives & Records Serv.,
609 F.2d 702, 711 (4th Cir. 1979).
29. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 609. "Disparate treatment.., is the most easily
understood type of discrimination." Id. (citing International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)). Individual disparate treatment
claims normally concern specific instances of allegedly different and unfavorable
treatment of a single employee or applicant. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); see also BARARA LINDEMANN SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw 21-25 (2d ed. 1983) (explaining elements of dis-
parate treatment claim).
A plaintiff, or group of plaintiffs, may also attempt to prove that an employer
operated under a formal policy or maintained a "pattern or practice" of discrimi-
nation which adversely affected the plaintiff. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 120-22 (1985) (ruling that airlines transfer policy facially
discriminated against older employees); City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water &
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 716 (1978) (finding that policy which required
women to contribute more than men to pension plan because women live longer
was facially discriminatory); Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 334 (assessing liability because
employer's "standard operating procedure" was to discriminate against racial
minorities).
30. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15 (stating that "proof of discriminatory
motive is critical, although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact
of differences in treatment"); United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens,
460 U.S. 711, 714 n.3 (1983) (same); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567,
576-78 (1978) (same).
The order and allocation of the burdens of proof in a Title VII disparate im-
pact case were set forth in a line of Supreme Court cases. See McDonnell Douglas,
411 U.S. at 802; Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981);
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
Under the framework laid out in these cases, the plaintiff-employee has the
burden of proving a prima facie case. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. To es-
tablish a prima facie case the plaintiff must show: (1) membership in the class
protected by the statute; (2) that plaintiff was qualified for the position sought or
that their work met employer's legitimate expectations; (3) that the employer
made an employment decision that was adverse to the plaintiff, and (4) that the
employer sought other applicants with similar qualifications or replaced the plain-
tiff-employee with someone with similar qualifications. Id.
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ADEA clearly contemplates disparate treatment claims.3
1
The disparate impact theory was created by the Supreme Court in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.32 A disparate impact claim challenges "employ-
ment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, an inference of discrimination
arises and the burden of production "shifts to the defendant . . . to rebut the
presumption of discrimination by producing evidence that the plaintiff was re-
jected ... for a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254. If
the employer can show legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the challenged
hiring decision, the plaintiff is given an opportunity to show that the employer's
reasons are actually a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 256; see also EEOC v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 308-09 (7th Cir. 1988) (examining requirements for
rebutting prima facie case). The defendant may also show that the employment
decision which is alleged to be discriminatory was based on a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification (BFOQ) or that the conduct is otherwise exempted from liabil-
ity under the statute. See 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1994) (setting out BFOQ defense); 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (3) (e) (1994) (same); Western Air Lines v. Criswell, 472 U.S.
400, 416-17 (1985) (applying BFOQ defense).
In Hicks, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff must show that the em-
ployer's proffered reasons were not only false, but were also discriminatory. 509
U.S. at 518. For a discussion of the Hicks decision, see Louis Rappaport, Note, St.
Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: Has the Supreme Court Turned Its Back on Title VII By
Rejecting "Pretext-Only"?, 39 ViLL. L. REv. 123, 126-32 (1994) (discussing significantly
heightened burden of proof Hicks imposed on employment discrimination
plaintiffs).
A plaintiff may also prevail by showing that both discriminatory and nondis-
criminatory factors contributed to the employer's adverse decision. See Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (finding liability based on "mixed
motives"). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden is on the em-
ployer to prove that it would have made the same decision if the discriminatory
reasons had not been considered. Id. at 242-45; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)
(1991) (amending Title VII to codify this "motivating factor" standard). See gener-
ally SCHLE & GROSSMAN, supra note 29, at 1317-18 nn.80-91 (discussing McDonnell
Douglas framework).
31. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 610 ("Disparate treatment ... captures the es-
sence of what Congress sought to prohibit in the ADEA."); see 29 U.S.C.
§ 623(a)(2) (prohibiting discriminatory decisions made "because of age").
Claims of disparate treatment because of age are analyzed under the same
standards used to analyze disparate treatment claims under Title VII. See Thurston,
469 U.S. at 121 (recognizing similarities between ADEA and Title VII); Woroski v.
Nashua Corp., 31 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 1994) (applying McDonnell Douglas stan-
dard in age case); Lindahl v. Air France, 930 F.2d 1434, 1437 (9th Cir. 1991)
(same).
32. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). As support for creation of the disparate impact the-
ory, the Court relied on the general purpose of the statute and on general lan-
guage in Title VII. Id. at 429-32. Section 703(a) (2) of Title VII states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer...
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2).
The Criggs Court stated: "The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination
but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. Absence
of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing
9
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mechanisms that operate as 'built in headwinds' for minority groups and are unre-
lated to measuring job capability." Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
The disparate impact theory was developed in subsequent cases. See, e.g., Al-
bemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (setting out framework for
litigating disparate impact claims); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329-31
(1977) (explaining proof requirements and proper statistical comparisons in dis-
parate impact case); Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 456 (1982) (holding that
employer's showing of nondiscriminatory "bottom line" is not defense to disparate
impact claim); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988) (ap-
proving of application of disparate impact analysis to subjective employment
practices).
In general, under both Title VII and ADEA precedent, to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination based on the disparate impact theory, a plaintiff must:
(1) identify the specific employment policy or practice that is challenged and (2)
demonstrate causation by offering "statistical evidence of a kind and degree suffi-
cient to show that the practice in question has caused the exclusion of applicants
for jobs or promotions because of their membership in a protected group." Wat-
son, 487 U.S. at 994; see also Nanayakkara v. California State Univ., 60 F.3d 834 (9th
Cir. 1995) (applying standards for prima facie case); EGLrr, supra note 13, at 7-288
(discussing elements of prima facie case). A disparate impact plaintiff must use
statistics to establish a prima facie case. Watson, 487 U.S. at 987 (discussing need
for statistical evidence in disparate impact cases); EGLrr, supra note 13, at 7-289. If
the employee meets the initial burden, the employer has the burden of showing
that the challenged practice is job-related and consistent with business necessity.
See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (placing burden of
proving business necessity on employer); see also 137 CONG. REc. 15276 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 703(k) (1) (A) (i)) (establishing business necessity defense); Fitzpatrick
v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1117-19 (11th Cir. 1993) (discussing business neces-
sity defense); EEOC v. Rath Packing Co., 787 F.2d 318, 331-32 (8th Cir. 1986)
(noting that "the proper standard.., is not whether [the discriminatory practice]
is justified by routine business considerations but whether there is a compelling
need for ... that practice"). If the employer makes such a showing, the employee
must show that other selection methods that have less discriminatory effects are
available and are sufficient to serve the employer's legitimate needs. Albemarle, 422
U.S. at 425. See generally Palmer v. United States, 794 F.2d 534, 536-37 (9th Cir.
1985) (discussing requirements for prima facie ADEA case under disparate impact
theory); Popko v. City of Clairton, 570 F. Supp. 446, 451 (W.D. Pa. 1983) (setting
out framework for disparate impact case).
In certain instances, various employment practices have been held to have a
disparate impact. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 (1977) (finding
that height and weight requirements had disparate impact based on gender);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 250 (1976) (finding that written test of verbal
skills had disparate impact based on race); Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 425 (finding that,
under particular set of facts, use of written aptitude test had disparate impact
based on race).
The Court severely limited the scope of the disparate impact theory in Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). However, the Civil Rights Act of
1991 legislatively overruled the parts of Wards Cove that dealt with disparate impact
and reinstated much of the caselaw which preceded that decision. See 164 CONG.
Rac. H9528 (interpretive memorandum of Congressman Edwards) (stating that
Congress's intent was to re-instate law as it had been in Griggs and its progeny).
For a further discussion of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, see infra notes 84-95 and
accompanying text. If disparate impact analysis is available under the ADEA, it is
unclear whether the allocation of proof from the Civil Rights Act of 1991 or from
Wards Cove would apply. Compare Houghton v. Sipco, Inc., 38 F.3d 953, 958 (8th
Cir. 1995) (holding that allocation of burdens of proof set out in Wards Cove ap-
plies to ADEA disparate impact cases), with Day v. Board of Regents, 911 F. Supp.
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groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and
cannot be justified by business necessity." 33 A disparate impact case does
not require proof of discriminatory intent.
3 4
While liability under the disparate treatment model is based on differ-
ent treatment of people who are alike in relevant ways, the disparate im-
pact theory assumes people from different groups are different and bases
liability on the reasons an employer offers to justify its policies that cause
different effects. 35 In disparate impact cases, "the touchstone is business
1228, 1243 (D. Neb. 1995) (holding that allocation of burdens of proof set forth in
1991 Civil Rights Act applies to ADEA disparate impact cases).
33. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 609; Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336 n.15. Prior to the
1991 amendments, Title VII did not specifically authorize disparate impact analy-
sis; instead, the theory developed under a line of Title VII cases. See Griggs, 401
U.S. at 429-30 (authorizing use of disparate impact analysis in Title VII claims);
Washington, 426 U.S. at 247 (same); Dothard, 433 U.S. at 321 (same).
In Griggs, on the day before Title VII was to take effect, an employer who had
openly discriminated against African-Americans in the past, implemented testing
and education requirements for promotions. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 427-28. African-
Americans in the geographic area had long been denied educational opportuni-
ties and generally could not meet the education and testing requirements which
the factory had imposed for the best jobs. Id. The requirements preserved the
discriminatory status quo at the workplace. Id. The Griggs Court stated that al-
lowing claims based on the disparate impact theory furthered the congressional
purpose behind Title VII of "achiev[ing] equality of employment opportunities"
and removing "artificial, arbitrary and unnecessary barriers to employment." Id. at
429-31. The availability of the theory is related to the recognition that direct evi-
dence of discriminatory motive or animus will often not be available. See, e.g., Aik-
ens, 460 U.S. at 716 (recognizing that "there will seldom be 'eyewitness' testimony
as to the employer's mental processes"); Thornbrough v. Columbus & Greenville
R.R. Co., 760 F.2d 633, 638 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding that "[u]nless the employer is
a latter-day George Washington, employment discrimination is as difficult to prove
as who chopped down the cherry tree"). But cf Gillin v. Federal Paper Bd. Co.,
479 F.2d 97, 102 (2d Cir. 1973) (finding direct evidence of sex discrimination).
34. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 609. Discriminatory motive is irrelevant because
impact analysis is designed to implement Congressional concern with "the conse-
quences of employment practices, not simply the motivation." Griggs, 401 U.S. at
432.
The purpose of the disparate impact theory is to allow plaintiffs to make out a
case without producing evidence of the employer's intent. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at
335 n.15. The focus is usually "on statistical disparities, rather than specific inci-
dents, and on competing explanations for those disparities." Watson, 487 U.S. at
987. Statistical proof of discrimination is often the only evidence available to an
employment discrimination plaintiff. Id.
35. See Douglas A. Laycock, Statistical Proof and Theories of Discrimination, 49
LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBs. 97, 98-99 (1986) (examining principles underlying each
method of proving discrimination); see also Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 828 F.2d
1202, 1215 (7th Cir. 1987). (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (warning that disparate
treatment and disparate impact methods of proof must be kept analytically sepa-
rate); EEOC v. Warshawsky & Co., 768 F. Supp. 647, 652 (N.D. Ill. 1991) ("Dispa-
rate impact analysis recognizes that not all employees are similarly situated and,
thus, a facially neutral employment policy may affect one group more than an-
other because of the differences in the group."); Kaminshine, supra note 14, at 259
(explaining that "[d]isparate impact theory . . . is concerned with employment
11
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necessity. t36 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 was enacted to expressly make
disparate impact part of Title VII's statutory scheme.3 7 As previously
stated, the availability of disparate impact anlysis under the ADEA is
unclear.
II. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND THE TEXT OF THE ADEA:
COMPARISONS WITH TITLE VII
This Section analyzes the portions of the legislative history and text of
the ADEA that are relevant to the availability of disparate impact.3 8 The
ADEA was inspired by and modeled after Title VII, and thus, any analysis
of the statute includes comparisons with Tide VII.3 9 This Section con-
cludes that analysis of the legislative history and text of the ADEA does not
lead to a clear answer as to whether disparate impact claims are cognizable
under the ADEA.
practices which are neither overtly nor covertly based on age but which have an
unjustified age-based effect").
36. Criggs, 401 U.S. at 431. An employer will only be liable for the disparate
impact caused by a neutral policy if the challenged policy is unrelated to the job
and not a business necessity. Id. "If an employment practice which operates to
exclude [a protected group] cannot be shown to be related to job performance,
the practice is prohibited." Id. For a detailed discussion of the business necessity
defense, seeJames 0. Pearson, Jr., Annotation, What Constitutes "Business Necessity"
Justifying Employment Practice Prima Facie Discriminatory Under Title VII of Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 36 A.L.R. FED. 9 (1995).
37. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994)). Section 105 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
amended § 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to clarify that disparate impact is
available and that the burden of proving business necessity is on the employer.
§ 105, 105 Stat. at 1076. Congress's most recent attempt to protect a group from
employment discrimination, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), clearly al-
lows disparate impact claims. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b). The ADA states:
(a) No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual
with a disability because of the disability of such individual...
(b) As used in subsection (a), the term "discriminate" includes-
(3) utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of administration ...
that have the effect of discrimination on the basis of disability ...
(6) using qualification standards, employment tests or other selec-
tion criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a
disability or a class of individuals with disabilities unless the standard, test
or other selection criteria, as used by the covered entity, is shown to be
job-related for the position in question and is consistent with business
necessity ....
Id.
38. For a discussion of the legislative history of the ADEA, see infra notes 40-
50 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the text of the ADEA, see infra
notes 58-85 and accompanying text.
39. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 & n.12 (1978) (commenting that
substantive provisions of ADEA "were derived in haec verba" from Title VII). "In
haec verba" means "in the same words." BLACK's LAw DIcTIONARY 782 (6th ed.
1990).
1538 [Vol. 41: p. 1527
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A. The Legislative History of the ADEA
Congress first considered proscribing age discrimination by federal
statute during the debates over Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.40
While age was not included in the final draft of Title VII, the statute or-
dered the Secretary of Labor to study the problem of age discrimination
and report to Congress.4 1 The Secretary's report was the impetus and the
blueprint for the ADEA.4
2
The Secretary found that older workers had to overcome serious ob-
stacles in the job market.43 The report discussed the problems of unem-
ployed workers who have developed, over many years, firm-specific skills
that cannot easily be transferred to a differentjob setting.44 The Secretary
found that while "age discrimination rarely was based on the sort of ani-
mus motivating other forms of discrimination," it was based on stereotypes
about the abilities of older workers that were generally refuted by empiri-
cal evidence. 45 The Secretary concluded that arbitrary age discrimination
was harmful to the national economy because it deprived the nation of
40. See EGLrr, supra note 13, at 7-10 (discussing history of ADEA); JOSEPH E.
KALET, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT LAw 1-3 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing leg-
islative history of ADEA). A proposed amendment in the House of Representa-
tives, that would have added age to Title VII's list of protected characteristics, was
rejected by a vote of 123 to 94. 110 CONG. REC. 2596-99 (1964). A similar amend-
ment was rejected in the Senate by a vote of 63 to 28. 110 CONG. REc. 9911-13
(1964); see also Blumrosen, supra note 16, at 106-15 (asserting that legislators at-
tempted to include age in Title VII so that statute would be considered too broad
and thus would not pass). See generally Kaminshine, supra note 14, at 235 (discuss-
ing events preceding passage of ADEA).
41. Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 715, 78 Stat. 265 (1964) (repealed 1966). As stated
above, some legislators argued for the inclusion of "age" in Title VII's list of pro-
tected categories. 110 CONG. REc. 2596-99, 9911-13 (1964). The order to the Sec-
retary of Labor to make a "full and complete study of the factors which may tend to
result in discrimination in employment because of age" was a compromise. Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 715, 78 Stat. 265 (1964). See generally
Blumrosen, supra note 16, at 106-15 (discussing history of ADEA in detail).
42. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER, AGE DISCRIMINATION
IN EMPLOYMENT, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR TO THE CONGRESS UNDER SEC-
TION 715 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1965), reprinted in EEOC, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT (1981) [hereinafter SEC-
RETARY'S REPORT]. Willard Wirtz was the Secretary of Labor. See also Blumrosen,
supra note 16, at 83 (finding that Secretary's Report was "the basic document shap-
ing the thinking of Congress which led to the Age Discrimination Act").
43. SECRETARY'S REPORT, supra note 42, at 11-15.
44. Id. at 11-17.
45. Id. at 3-6. The Secretary stated: "We have found no evidence of prejudice
based on dislike or intolerance of the older worker." Id. The Secretary further
stated: "[t]he 'discrimination' older workers have most to fear ... is not from any
employer malice, or unthinking majority, but from the ruthless play of wholly im-
personal forces." Id. at 3. This can be contrasted with the Supreme Court's find-
ing that Title VII's legislative history evidences a clear congressional intent to
eradicate long-standing employment barriers that "operate invidiously to discrimi-
nate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification." Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971); see also KALET, supra note 40, at 2 (detailing
Secretary's findings).
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productive workers and resulted in increased unemployment insurance
and social security benefit costs.46 Further, the Secretary found that age
discrimination inflicted serious economic and psychological costs on older
workers.
4 7
The Secretary's report distinguished "arbitrary age discrimination"
from "factors which bear more strongly on older workers as a group than
younger workers. '48 The Secretary urged Congress to enact legislation
prohibiting "arbitrary" age discrimination and to establish government-
funded programs to increase the access of older workers to education,
training and job referral opportunities. 49 Congress passed the ADEA in
1967 largely as a result of the Secretary's report.50
The Secretary's report is sometimes interpreted as targeting
mandatory retirement policies and recommending that such practices be
prohibited, while suggesting that the "other factors" which adversely affect
46. SECRETARY'S REPORT, supra note 42, at 18.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 19. In EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983), the Supreme Court
summarized the findings of the Secretary's report:
(1) Many employers adopted specific age limitations in those States that
had not prohibited them by their own anti-discrimination laws, although
many other employers were able to operate successfully without them. (2)
In the aggregate, these age limitations had a marked effect upon the em-
ployment of older workers. (3) Although age discrimination rarely was
based on the sort of animus motivating some other forms of discrimina-
tion, it was based in large part on stereotypes unsupported by objective
fact, and was often defended on grounds different from its actual causes.
(4) Moreover, the available empirical evidence demonstrated that arbi-
trary age lines were in fact generally unfounded and that, as an overall
matter, the performance of older workers was at least as good as that of
younger workers. (5) Finally, arbitrary age discrimination was profoundly
harmful ....
Id. at 231.
Mandatory retirement policies are obvious examples of arbitrary age discrimi-
nation. SECRETARY'S REPORT, supra note 42, at 5-6. Education, training and testing
requirements are examples of neutral standards that might have an adverse impact
on older workers. Id.
49. SECRETARY'S REPORT, supra note 42, at 21-25.
50. See KALET, supra note 40, at 2 (discussing Secretary's report and conclud-
ing that "[t]he Report led directly to the enactment of the ADEA"); see also Wyo-
ming, 460 U.S. at 230-31 (discussing legislative history of ADEA and noting that
recommendations in Secretary's report were accepted by executive and legislative
branches).
The structure recommended in the Secretary's report was adopted in the
ADEA. See 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1994). The statute, as enacted, reflects the Secretary's
distinction between "arbitrary discrimination" and "certain otherwise desirable
practices [that] may work to the disadvantage of older persons." Id. at § 621 (a) (2).
The statute outlaws "arbitrary discrimination" and establishes education and re-
search programs to address "the impact of age on employment." Id. § 621(b).
For a discussion of the passage of age discrimination legislation, see LAWRENCE
M. FRIEDMAN, YOUR TIME WILL COME: THE LAW OF AGE DISCRIMINATION AND
MANDATORY RETIREMENT 5-16 (1984).
[Vol. 41: p. 15271540
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older workers should be dealt with through education and conciliation. 51
In other words, advocates for employers argue, the Secretary supported
liability for disparate treatment, but opposed disparate impact liability.
5 2
The Secretary acknowledged, however, that neutral policies which have an
adverse impact on older workers might constitute "arbitrary" discrimina-
tion.5 3 Further, the fact that the Secretary's report was delivered six years
51. See Blumrosen, supra note 16, at 76-79. Professor Blumrosen stated that:
[T] he Secretary's report did not suggest that institutional practices which
had an "adverse effect" on older workers should be declared illegal. On
the contrary, it recommended that institutional pressures, such as those
arising from pension systems, be eased by special programs which would
not discourage hiring of older workers. The only practice which the re-
port proposed to declare illegal was the setting of a specific age limit for
hiring or termination in disregard of individual capacity. Such a practice
would have to be "intentional" by its nature.
Id. at 79; see also Kaminshine, supra note 14, at 288 (conceding that Secretary of
Labor regarded overt age ceilings as "most obvious" and "odious form of age
discrimination").
52. See Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999, 1008 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 2500 (1996). The Ellis court found:
[T] he legislative history of the ADEA suggests it was not enacted to ad-
dress disparate impact claims. Congress enacted the ADEA in large part
on a report it commissioned from the Secretary of Labor
.... That report differentiated between what it termed "arbitrary discrim-
ination" based on age (intentional discrimination based on age stereo-
types) and problems resulting from factors that "affect older workers
more strongly, as a group, than they do younger employees" (disparate
impact). The report then recommended that Congress prohibit "arbi-
trary discrimination," but that factors which "affect older workers" be ad-
dressed through programmatic measures to improve opportunities for
older workers.
Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Blumrosen, supra note 16, at 10. Professor
Blumrosen states: "The [Secretary's] report did not suggest that institutional prac-
tices which had an 'adverse effect' on older workers should be declared illegal ....
The only practice which the report proposed to declare illegal was the setting of a
specific age limit for hiring or termination in disregard of individual capacity." Id.;
Stacey, supra note 16, at 439-43 (explaining that Congress enacted ADEA to pro-
hibit only arbitrary age limitations). One commentator finds that the distinction
between arbitrary discrimination and "other factors" which adversely impact older
workers "permeates the legislative history of the ADEA." Id. at 440. This commen-
tator concludes that "[t]he 'disparate impact' test of discrimination is implicitly
rejected." Id. at 442.
53. SECRETARY's REPORT, supra note 42, at 5. The Secretary observed that "cer-
tain specific practices intended to favor older workers might constitute 'arbitrary'
discrimination because of their unintended adverse effect." Id. at 15-17. (discuss-
ing seniority systems, promotion from within policies, and retirement and insur-
ance plans).
One commentator points out that the Secretary almost surely did not intend
to remedy the disparate impact of facially neutral rules that are completely unre-
lated to job performance by establishing government funded programs to assist
older workers. See Kaminshine, supra note 14, at 294 ("It is one thing for the Secre-
tary to propose tax-supported assistance for older workers who need training and
cannot meet necessary education or testing standards; it would be quite extraordi-
nary, however, to propose the use of government-sponsored programs to combat
the effect of arbitrary, unnecessary, or illegitimate standards. In the latter circum-
154119961 COMMENT
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before the Supreme Court's establishment of disparate impact analysis in
Griggs weakens the argument that the Secretary was drawing a distinction
between disparate treatment and disparate impact.
5 4
The congressional debates which preceded the passage of the ADEA
do not mention the disparate impact theory.5 5 Title VII's legislative his-
tory is also silent on disparate impact.56 In Griggs, the Supreme Court
relied on the broad purpose of Title VII as support for the holding that
disparate impact analysis was consistent with Congress's intent.57 Argua-
bly, the same reasoning could support extension of disparate impact to
age discrimination claims. The legislative history of the ADEA does not,
however, provide a clear answer as to whether Congress intended to pro-
vide for disparate impact liability under the ADEA.
stance, the obvious remedy is to compel a better standard, not to excuse the poor
one.") (internal citations omitted).
54. See Kaminshine, supra note 14, at 290-91 (stating that chronology of events
indicates that legislature did not consider disparate impact). Professor Kamin-
shine states:
[T]he commentators in opposition [to the extension of disparate impact
to the ADEA] infer too much from the Secretary's preoccupation with
overt age restrictions
.... Theories about discrimination and disparate impact would not crys-
talize for several years and would not become established until the
Supreme Court's decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. in 1971. While this
chronology does not render the Secretary's report irrelevent, it arguably
diminishes its capacity to reveal a specific intent about concepts and defi-
nitions that had yet to emerge in this new area of the law.
Id. (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)).
55. See S. REP. No. 90-723 (1967) (discussing floor debates preceding passage
of ADEA); H.R. REP. No. 90-805 (1967) (same), reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.CA.N.
2213. There was some discussion in Congress of requiring rules to be "job re-
lated." See 113 CONG. REC. 31,253 (1967) (statement of SenatorYarborough) ("For
example, if a test shows that a man cannot do certain things. He might fail to pass
the test at 35; he might fail to pass the test at 55. Some men slow up sooner than
others. If the job requires a certain speed and the differentiation is based upon
factors other than age, the law would not apply."). The disparate impact theory
did not crystallize, however, for several more years, and it was not directly consid-
ered by Congress during the passage of the ADEA. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-31
(establishing disparate impact theory).
56. See Kaminshine, supra note 14, at 291 (noting "one searches in vain in the
legislative history to Title VII to find any specific attention to, or awareness of, the
concept of disparate impact liability").
57. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-31. The Court stated:
The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the
language of the statute. It was to achieve equality of employment oppor-
tunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an
identifiable group of white employees over other employees.... What is
required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary
barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discrimi-
nate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification.
Id. (emphasis added). For a discussion of the Griggs decision and the disparate
impact theory, see supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
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B. A Compaiison of the Text of the ADE4 and the Text of Title VII
The text of the ADEA does not specifically authorize disparate impact
analysis.5 8 The ADEA prohibits employers from basing adverse employ-
ment decisions on age. 59 Section 623 (a) (1) of the ADEA proscribes deci-
sions not to hire "because of' a person's age.60 Section 623(a) (2)
proscribes decisions which adversely limit, segregate or classify employees
because of age. 61 The term "because of such individual's age" indicates an
intent to prohibit only intentional discrimination. 62 Nevertheless,
§ 623(a) (2) does prohibit employment actions that "otherwise adversely
affect" an employee. 63 This language has been interpreted as authoriza-
tion for disparate impact claims.
64
58. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
59. See id. § 623(a)(1)-(2) (proscribing adverse employment decisions "with
respect to... compensation, terms, conditions or privileges" of employment which
are made "because of ... age"). Employers are also prohibited from reducing
wages in order to comply with the statute. Id. § 623(a)(3). Similar prohibitions
apply to employment agencies and labor organizations. Id. § 623(b)-(c). The stat-
ute also proscribes retaliation against employees who oppose practices made un-
lawful by the statute. Id. § 623(d).
60. Id. § 623(a) (1). The statute states: "It shall be unlawful for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment, because of such individual's age." Id.
61. Id. § 623(a) (2). The statute states: "It shall be unlawful for an employer
... (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise ad-
versely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's age." Id.
62. Id. § 623(a)(1)-(2). "It would be a stretch to read the phrase 'because of
such individual's age' to prohibit incidental and unintentional discrimination that
resulted because of employment decisions which were made for reasons other than
age." Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999, 1007 (10th Cir.) (citation omitted),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2500 (1996); see also Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S.
604, 611-12 (1993) (finding that ADEA "requires the employer to ignore an em-
ployee's age ... it does not specify further characteristics that an employer must
also ignore").
63. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2). The statute reads: "It shall be unlawful for an em-
ployer... (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's age." Id. (em-
phasis added).
64. See Kaminshine, supra note 14, at 300 (arguing that language could sup-
port extension of disparate impact to ADEA, but conceding that language alone
"does not require an interpretation that would include disparate impact"). But see
Krop, supra note 15, at 842-43 (arguing that grammatical arrangement of section
does not support disparate impact theory). This Note has been cited with approval
by a number of courts. See, e.g., Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 618 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring) (citing section of Note which discusses grammatical arrangement of statute).
One commentator argues that the clause "because of such individual's age" modi-
fies the infinitive clause at the beginning of the section, namely, "to limit, segre-
gate, or clarify," but not the phrase "adversely affect," which is part of the verb for
the dependent clause beginning with "which would deprive." Krop, supra note 15,
at 842-43. This commentator interprets the section as prohibiting employers from
limiting, segregating or classifying employees because of their age, in any way
17
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The substantive language of the ADEA is derived, in large part, from
the language of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.65 The statutory
prohibitions of the two acts are nearly identical. 66 The language of Tide
which would adversely affect their employment status. Id. at 843. In other words,
age-based classifications are prohibited, but age-neutral classifications that may in-
cidentally affect older workers to a greater degree are not prohibited. Id.
If disparate impact liability is based on the language of section 623 (a) (2), that
language applies to "employees," but does not explicitly apply to job applicants.
See id. ("[S]ection 623(a) (2) addresses only actions taken by an employer which
affect employees."). After Griggs, however, courts have gone beyond section
703(a) (2) of Title VII and have upheld Title VII disparate impact claims brought
under section 703(a) (1), which applies to applicants. See Colby v.J.C. Penney Co.,
811 F.2d 1119, 1127 (7th Cir. 1987) (rejecting argument that disparate impact
analysis only applies to termination cases); Wambheim v.J.C. Penney Co., 705 F.2d
1492, 1494 (9th Cir. 1983) (applying disparate impact analysis in fringe benefit
case). The language of section 623(a)(1) of the ADEA is taken from section
703(a) (1) of Title VII. If the argument is that the similar language, structure and
purpose of Title VII and the ADEAjustifies extension of disparate impact to age
claims, then disparate impact should be available in claims challenging age dis-
crimination in all aspects of the employer-employee relationship as it is under Tide
VII. See EEOC v. Borden's, Inc., 724 F.2d 1390, 1394 (9th Cir. 1984) (applying
disparate impact in termination case based on reasoning set forth above).
65. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 & n.12 (1978) (noting that sub-
stantive provisions of ADEA "were derived in haec verba" from Title VII); Hodgson
v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 455 F.2d 818, 820 (5th Cir. 1972) (observing that
prohibitions of ADEA are almost identical to Title VII). For a discussion of the
legislative history of the ADEA, see supra notes 41-57 and accompanying text.
The use of disparate impact as a theory of liability is one of the only areas in
which the use of Title VII as a guide to interpreting the ADEA has been ques-
tioned. See Kaminshine, supra note 14, at 231 (commenting that ADEA's borrow-
ing of disparate impact theory from Title VII is still controversial).
66. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1)-(2) (ADEA provision) which provides:
It shall be unlawful for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such indi-
vidual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportuni-
ties or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's age;
with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1)-(2) (1994) (Title VII provision) which provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such indi-
vidual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individ-
ual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin.
Id. Prior to the 1991 amendments to Title VII, the availability of disparate impact
under Tide VII was based on 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). While the prohibitory lan-
guage of the ADEA is derived from Title VII, however, the enforcement mecha-
nisms are taken from both Title VII and the Fair Labor Standards Act. See Fair
[Vol. 41: p. 15271544
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VII did not specifically authorize disparate impact analysis. Rather, dispa-
rate impact was a judicial creation, based on the broad goals of Title VII
and the general language of § 703 (a) (2).67 Extension of disparate impact
analysis to the ADEA is arguably supported by the analogous general pur-
poses of the ADEA and Title VII and the similar language of ADEA
§ 623(a) (2) and Tide VII § 703(a) (2).68 Based upon these similarities,
several courts have concluded that disparate impact analysis is appropriate
under the ADEA.69 The argument that the similar language of Title VII
Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (setting out enforcement mech-
anisms of FLSA).
67. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (interpreting Title VII
as "proscrib[ing] not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in
form, but discriminatory in operation"). The doctrine was codified in the Civil
Rights Act of 1991. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (amending Title VII to clarify availabil-
ity of disparate impact).
68. See Ziegler, supra note 14, at 1050-53 (arguing that analogous language of
29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) (2) justifies extension of dispa-
rate impact doctrine to ADEA context). But see Dibiase v. SmithKline Beecham
Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 733 (3d Cir.) (stating "[Ziegler's] reading of the statute is
inaccurate"), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 306 (1995). For the text of the relevant provi-
sions of Title VII and the ADEA, see supra note 66.
The ADEA's stated purpose is (1) "to promote employment of older persons
based on their ability rather than age;" (2) "to prohibit arbitrary age discrimina-
tion in employment;" and (3) "to help employers and workers find ways of meeting
problems arising from the impact of age on employment." 29 U.S.C. § 621(b); see
also Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 409-12 (1985) (recognizing
broad purposes of ADEA).
Advocates for the availability of disparate impact under the ADEA point to the
broad goal of "promot[ing] employment of older persons" and argue that dispa-
rate impact liability is an effective means to this end. See Charles A. Sullivan &
Michael J. Zimmer, Proving a Violation Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967, 17 SETON HALL L. REv. 803, 831-32 (1989) (arguing that disparate impact
is necessary to fulfill Congress's goals); Ziegler, supra note 14, at 1038-40 (finding
that objectives of statute support use of disparate impact analysis). Opponents of
the extension of disparate impact analysis to age cases argue that the purpose is to
"prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment" but not to provide relief
when a neutral policy happens to have an adverse impact on those over age 40.
Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 828 F.2d 1202, 1220 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J.,
dissenting).
Those who support the extension of disparate impact theory as a means of
proving age discrimination argue that Title VII authorizes disparate impact analy-
sis and that courts have traditionally depended on Title VII precedent to interpret
the ADEA. See Monce v. City of San Diego, 895 F.2d 560, 561 (9th Cir. 1990)
(ruling that complementary provisions of Title VII and ADEA are to be construed
consistently); Bass v. City of Wilson, 835 F. Supp. 255, 257-58 (E.D.N.C. 1993)
(same).
69. EEOC v. Borden's, Inc. 724 F.2d 1390, 1394 (9th Cir. 1984) (reasoning
that "the similar language, structure, and purpose of Title VII and the ADEA, as
well as the similarity of the analytic problems posed in interpreting the two statutes
has led us to adopt disparate impact in cases under the ADEA"). In EEOC v. Gover-
nor Mifflin School District, 623 F. Supp. 734 (E.D. Pa. 1985), the court held that
disparate impact analysis applies to the ADEA because of the similarity of the lan-
guage of the two statutes. Id. at 739-41; see also Note, The Cost of Growing Old: Busi-
ness Necessity and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 88 YALE L.J. 565, 566-67,
595 (1979) (concluding that disparate impact is available under ADEA); Note,
15451996] COMMENT
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and the ADEA supports extension of disparate impact analysis to age cases
is weakened, however, by the fact that Congress amended Tide VII to ex-
pressly include disparate impact as part of Title VII's statutory scheme and
did not similarly amend the ADEA.
70
C. The "Reasonable Factors Other than Age" Affirmative Defense
The ADEA provides employers with an affirmative defense for em-
ployment decisions based on "reasonable factors other than age"
("RFOA"). 7 1 There is no similar provision in Tide VII. 7 2
The Equal Pay Act 7 3 provides a similar statutory defense that allows
an employer to pay men and women different amounts for equal work if
the differentiation is "based on any other factor other than sex."7 4 This
language has been interpreted to preclude disparate impact claims under
the Equal Pay Act. 75 The Equal Pay Act provision, however, exempts em-
Proving Discrimination Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 17 ARIz. L. REv.
495, 515-17 (1975) (same).
70. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (amending Title VII to
clarify availability of disparate impact). For a discussion of the 1991 Amendments
to Title VII, see infra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
71. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1) (1994). The statute provides:
It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or labor
organization-
(1) to take any action otherwise prohibited under subsections (a),
(b), (c), or (e) of this section where age is a bona fide occupational quali-
fication reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular
business, or where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other
than age.
Id. The employer has the burden of showing that it relied on reasonable factors
other than age when it made its employment decision. See EEOC v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 725 F.2d 211, 222 (3d Cir. 1983) (stating that employer "bears the
burden of going forward with evidence to demonstrate reasonable factors, other
than age, justifying its action").
The ADEA provides other affirmative defenses. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f). An em-
ployer can avoid liability by showing that, while age was considered when an ad-
verse decision was made, youth is a "bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business." 29
U.S.C. § 623(f)(1). An employer can also avoid liability by showing that the chal-
lenged decision was made in order to comply with a "Bona Fide Seniority System
or Employee Benefit Plan." Id. § 623(f) (2) (A)-(B).
72. See City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702,
716-17 (1978) (rejecting argument that cost was reasonable factor, other than sex,
that employer should be permitted to rely on as defense to Title VII claim).
73. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1994).
74. Id. § 206(d) (1) (prohibiting employers from paying men and women dif-
ferent wages "except where such payment is made pursuant to ... a differential
based on any other factor other than sex").
75. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 170-71 (1981) (implying
that "other factors other than sex" language in Equal Pay Act precludes application
of disparate impact analysis); see also Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 828 F.2d 1202, 1220
(7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (finding that exception in Equal Pay
Act precluded disparate impact analysis under that statute).
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ployers from liability when they rely on "any other factor other than sex."76
The ADEA provision only exempts employers who rely on a "reasonable
factor other than age."17 7
The creation of the RFOA defense in the ADEA is sometimes inter-
preted as precluding disparate impact analysis under the ADEA.78 Advo-
cates for this position argue that structurally, the statute only makes sense
if it is read so that the prohibitory language in § 623(a) authorizes dispa-
rate treatment liability while the exception in § 623(f) (1), for "reasonable
factors other than age," precludes disparate impact liability.79 These advo-
76. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (emphasis added).
77. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (EPA provision), with 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1)
(ADEA provision). For the text of the ADEA "reasonable factors other than age"
("RFOA") defense, see supra note 71. For the text of the EPA defense, see supra
note 74. By limiting the exception to "reasonable" factors, Congress intended that
some factors would be covered and others would not. Interpreting section 623
(f) (1) to bar all disparate impact claims would necessarily mean that all factors
other than age are reasonable. This interpretation would render the word "rea-
sonable" meaningless. See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CON-
STRUCTION § 46.06 (5th ed. 1992) ("It is an elementary rule of construction that
effect must be given, if possible, to every word, clause and sentence of a statute.");
see also EEOC v. Governor Mifflin Sch. Dist., 623 F. Supp. 734, 740 (E.D. Pa. 1985)
(noting differences in phrasing of EPA and ADEA defenses).
For a general discussion of the "reasonable factors other than age" defense
and the disparate impact doctrine, see Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act's Forgotten Affirmative Defense: The Reasonable Factors Other than Age Excep-
tion, 66 B.U. L. REv. 155 (1986).
78. See Metz, 828 F.2d at 1220 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (arguing that
RFOA defense in § 623(f) should be read as taking disparate impact out of ADEA);
see also Markham v. Geller, 451 U.S. 945, 947-49 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (asserting that because cost is "reasonable factor other
than age," Court should have reviewed this case and held that because policy at
issue was based on cost and not age, there was no violation of ADEA). In the
opinion of Judges Rehnquist and Easterbrook, the statutory exception for deci-
sions based on "reasonable factors other than age" is facially inconsistent with lia-
bility based on the operation of a "neutral rule." But see Governor Mifflin, 623 F.
Supp. at 740 (determining that Supreme Court decision in County of Washington v.
Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981), was based on legislative history of Equal Pay Act and
that interpretation of "any other factor other than sex" defense as precluding dis-
parate impact cannot be extrapolated to interpret "reasonable factors other than
age" defense because of ADEA's different legislative history).
79. See Metz, 828 F.2d at 1220 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). Judge Easterbrook
argued:
Section 4(a) parallels Title VII in some respects but is different in others.
One striking difference is § 4(f) (1), which says that "reasonable factors
other than age" may be the basis of decision.... What else could be the
purpose of this language? Surely it does not mean simply that "only age
discrimination is age discrimination." "The prohibition and the excep-
tion appear identical. The sentence is incomprehensible unless the Pro-
hibition forbids disparate treatment and the exception authorizes
disparate impact."
Id. (quoting Douglas Laycock, Continuing Violations, Disparate Impact in Compensa-
tion, and Other Title VII Issues, 49 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 55 (1986)).
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cates claim that to read the statute otherwise would reduce the RFOA ex-
ception to mean that "only age discrimination is age discrimination. '80
The ADEA's RFOA provision has conversely been interpreted as codi-
fying the business necessity defense to disparate impact claims. 8 1 This ap-
proach is based on the premise that Congress did not intend to prohibit
age discrimination in § 623(a) and then approve of differentiation on the
basis of age in § 623(f) (1).82 The administrative agencies charged with
enforcing the ADEA have taken this approach. 83 Nevertheless, just as the
analysis of the ADEA's language and legislative history did not provide a
clear answer, the inclusion of the RFOA defense in the ADEA does not
provide a definitive answer to the question of whether Congress intended
to provide for disparate impact age claims.
80. Metz, 828 F.2d at 1220 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
81. See Massarsky v. General Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111, 132 (3d Cir. 1983)
(Sloviter, J., dissenting) ("[I] n disparate impact cases, the 'reasonable factors' de-
fense will overlap the business necessity upon which defendant must rely if it is to
rebut plaintiff's prima facie case." (citation omitted)).
82. Id.
83. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 860.103(f) (1) (i), (f) (2) (1969) (superseded by EEOC reg-
ulations at 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7 (1988)) (interpreting "reasonable factors" defense).
These interpretive regulations, which were issued by the Department of Labor at
the time the ADEA was enacted, explained that in order to qualify as a "reasonable
factor other than age," a neutral standard would have to be "reasonably necessary
for the specific work to be performed" or "shown to have a valid relationship to job
requirements." Id. The Department of Labor rejected the interpretation of the
reasonable factors defense as precluding disparate impact claims stating that:
To classify or group employees solely on the basis of age for the purpose
of comparing costs, or tor any other purpose, necessarily rests on the as-
sumption that the age factor alone may be used to justify a differentia-
tion-an assumption plainly contrary to the terms of the Act and the
purpose of Congress in enacting it. Differentials so based would serve
only to perpetuate and promote the very discrimination at which the Act
is directed.
29 C.F.R. § 860.103(b); see also Kaminshine, supra note 14, at 303 (asserting that
"the Department of Labor's contemporaneous understanding of the newly passed
statute is unusually germane, given its involvement and influence in the
legislation").
Research and enforcement responsibilities under the ADEA were originally
delegated to the Secretary of Labor, but a 1978 amendment shifted these responsi-
bilities to the EEOC. Reorganization Act of 1977, 5 U.S.C. §§ 901-912 (1994). The
interpretive regulations of the EEOC also require that a neutral rule having a dis-
arate impact on older workers be justified by business necessity. 29 C.F.R.
1625.7(d) (1996). Interpretations by administrative agencies responsible for the
enforcement of a statute are entitled to deference. See EEOC v. Commercial Of-
fice Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 115 (1988) (stating that agency's interpretation of
statute "need not be the best one by grammatical or any other standards. Rather,
the [agency's] interpretation of ambiguous language need only be reasonable to
be entitled to deference."); Chevron U.SA. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (holding that agency's interpretation need
only be "based on a permissible construction of the statute").
1548
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III. COMPARING THE ADEA AND TITLE VII AFTER THE CIVIL RIGHTS AcT
OF 1991
Title VII allows for disparate impact analysis. 84 Courts have tradition-
ally looked to the similar language, structure, purposes and histories of
Title VII and the ADEA when interpreting the ADEA.85 The statutes and
the wrongs they seek to remedy have never been identical.8 6 The
84. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1994)) (amending Title VII to authorize disparate im-
pact liability).
85. See, e.g., Western Air Lines v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 412-17, n.23 (1985)
(applying Title VII case law to interpret ADEA's bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion exception); Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 754-58 (1979) (relying
on Title VII to interpret parallel ADEA provisions governing relationship between
federal and state enforcement procedures); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003,
1015 (1st Cir. 1979) (considering similarities between Title VII and ADEA and
stating "one naturally might expect to use the same methods and burdens of
proof"); Quinn v. Bowmar Publ'g Co., 445 F. Supp. 780, 784 (D. Md. 1978) (ruling
that interpretation of Title VII procedures may be used to interpret ADEA proce-
dures); see also Sullivan & Zimmer, supra note 68, at 831-39 (recommending that
"more developed Title VII law should be examined" when litigating age claims).
But see Hiatt v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 859 F. Supp. 1416, 1436 (D. Wyo. 1994) (argu-
ing that age discrimination is different from types of discrimination covered by
Title VII and concludng that age discrimination cannot be evaluated under Title
VII legal principles), afrd, 65 F.3d 838 (10th Cir. 1995);Jeffrey L. Liddle, Disparate
Treatment Claims Under ADEA: The Negative Impact of McDonnell Douglas v. Green,
5 EMPLOYEE REL. LJ. 549, 558 (1979) (arguing that courts should develop distinc-
tive body of ADEA law and not simply rely on Title VII precedent); Peter H.
Schuck, Age Discrimination Revisited, 57 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1029, 1032-36 (1981) (ar-
guing that because age discrimination previously benefitted current members of
protected class and because it is not invidious, it is different from racial discrimina-
tion); Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 90 HARV. L. REv. 380,
410-11 (1976) (asserting that although substantive and procedural provisions of
Title VII and ADEA are nearly identical, distinctions between age, race and sex
discrimination justify different standards of proof and liability).
The similarity of the statutes alone has persuaded several courts to extend
disparate impact analysis to the ADEA. See, e.g., EEOC v. Governor Mifflin Sch.
Dist., 623 F. Supp. 734, 739-40 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (reasoning that because Title VII
was "inspiration" for ADEA, interpretations of Tide VII should be applied to
ADEA). For a discussion of cases which have held that disparate impact is available
under the ADEA because of the similarities between the ADEA and Title VII, see
infra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
86. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 574, 584 (1978) (finding that substantive
provisions of ADEA were derived "in haec verbd' from Title VII, but acknowledging
that there are "significant differences" in "remedial and procedural provisions of
the two laws").
Title VII covers smaller employers than those covered by the ADEA. Compare
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (employers with 15 or more employees), with 29 U.S.C.
§ 630(b) (1994) (employers with 20 or more employees). Title VII prohibits em-
ployers from "limitling], segregat[ing], or classify ing] employees or applicants for
employment' on the basis of race, sex, etc. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) (2) (emphasis
added). The ADEA's corresponding provision is confined to limiting, segregating
or classifying "employees" only. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2); see also Metz v. Transit Mix,
Inc., 828 F.2d 1202, 1220 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (noting
other differences between Title VII and ADEA, such as § 4(f) (3) of ADEA, which
allows for dismissal for cause); Stacey, supra note 16, at 445-47 (noting other differ-
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Supreme Court stated that age discrimination is different from discrimina-
tion based on race, national origin or gender.8 7 Stereotypes based on race
and national origin are always arbitrary and irrelevant to job performance,
whereas employment decisions based on age are sometimes justifiable be-
cause at some level, there is a degree of "correlation between age and
ability."88
Congress amended Title VII in 1991 to codify the methods and bur-
dens of proof in a disparate impact case, but chose not to similarly amend
the ADEA.89 At least one court has held that Congress's failure to amend
ences between Title VII and ADEA, such as more lenient enforcement provisions
of Title VII).
87. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976).
The Court stated:
While the treatment of the aged in this Nation has not been wholly free
of discrimination, such persons, unlike, say, those who have been discrim-
inated against on the basis of race or national origin, have not exper-
ienced 'a history of purposeful unequal treatment' or been subjected to
unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly in-
dicative of their abilities.... But even old age does not define a 'discrete
and insular' group, United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-
53 n.4 (1938), in need of 'extraordinary protection from the majoritarian
political process.' Instead it marks a stage that each of us will reach if we
live out our normal span.
Id.; see also Marshall v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 554 F.2d 730, 736 (5th Cir.
1977) (concluding that replacing older workers with younger ones "does not raise
the same inference of improper motive that attends replacement of a black by a
white person in a Title VII case").
88. See Hiatt v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 859 F. Supp. 1416, 1435-37 (D. Wyo.
1994) (asserting that disparate impact theory was extended to Title VII to remove
barriers unrelated to job performance, but that extension to age context is not
appropriate because at some point there is correlation between age and ability),
affd, 65 F.3d 838 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 917 (1996); RicHARD A.
POSNER, ACING AND OLD AGE 385 (1995) ("[T] here really is a process called aging
... generating palpable and often occupationally relevant physical and mental
differences between older and younger persons ...."). Opponents of the exten-
sion of disparate impact to the ADEA argue that discrimination based on immuta-
ble characteristics such as race and national origin is fundamentally different from
discrimination based on age. Elizabeth Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in
High Places, 95 HARv. L. REv. 947, 948 n.1 (1982). Professor Bartholet argues:
[T] he disparate impact doctrine adopted in ... Griggs was predicated on
the assumption that blacks and whites are inherently equal in ability and
that, but for historical discrimination, they would be equally well situated
in employment .... Similar assumptions cannot be made for all other
protected groups. Indeed, some-such as the aged and the handi-
capped-may be protected, in part, because they are likely as groups to
be less qualified for employment than others.
Id.; see also Stacey, supra note 16, at 438-39 (arguing that "[r]ace discrimination and
age discrimination represent different kinds of societal problems" and asserting
that "[a]ge discrimination, unlike race discrimination, is not a suspect classifica-
tion that necessitates strict scrutiny").
89. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e) (amending Title VII). The Act adds subsection (k) titled
"Burden of Proof in Disparate Impact Cases," to section 703 of Title VII. 105 Stat.
at 1074 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)). The amendment codifies the dispa-
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the ADEA supports the conclusion that disparate impact analysis is not
available under the ADEA.9° Reliance on congressional silence, however,
is problematic. 9 1
With respect to disparate impact and the 1991 Act, Congress's main
purpose was to clarify the definition of "business necessity" and to set forth
that the employer, and not the employee, has the burden of showing that
a challenged policy is a "business necessity." 92 Whether disparate impact
rate impact theory and the business necessity defense roughly as they existed
before the Supreme Court's decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S.
642 (1989) (altering standards of proof in disparate impact claims so that burden
of proof did not shift to employer after plaintiff made out prima facie case, and
requiring employers to merely produce some evidence of "business justification"
rather than requiring proof of business necessity); see also 137 CONG. Rxc. S15276
(daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 767 (clarifying that pur-
pose of legislative provisions which dealt with disparate impact was to overrule
changes made by Wards Cove and to return to status of law before that decision).
In general, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was prompted by a series of Supreme
Court decisions that were unfavorable for employment discrimination plaintiffs.
See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (holding that § 1981
only prohibits discriminatory hiring decisions and not discriminatory harassment
and discharge); Lorance v. AT&T Tech., Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989) (holding that
statute of limitations for filing charge began to run from time when facially neutral
policy was adopted and not from time when discriminatory effects were discov-
ered); Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 642 (requiring employee to prove business neces-
sity); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (holding that in "mixed-
motive" case, employer may completely avoid liability by proving that it would have
made same adverse decision even if admitted illegitimate consideration was not
taken into account).
The Act makes several important changes to employment discrimination law
other than the re-affirmation of the pre-Wards Cove disparate impact standards. See
generally Steven R. Wall, An Overview of The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the Preexisting
Law, in THE NEW CrVIL RIGHTS Acr OF 1991, at 1-12 (Pa. Bar Inst. 1992) (explain-
ing changes brought about by Civil Rights Act).
90. Martincic v. Urban Redevelopment Auth., 844 F. Supp. 1073, 1077-78
(W.D. Pa. 1994) (finding that Congress's failure to sanction disparate impact
claims in ADEA was "significant" and "not an oversight").
91. See EEOC v. Governor Mifflin Sch. Dist., 623 F. Supp. 734, 741 (E.D. Pa.
1985) (finding Congress's failure to clarify that disparate impact was not available
in ADEA cases, after courts had allowed disparate impact claims, persuasive evi-
dence of congressional intent to permit such claims).
92. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40, at 32-43 (1991) (explaining Congressional pur-
poses). Several Senate sponsors compromised on the meaning of "business neces-
sity." Id. at 32. These Senators stated: "[t]he terms 'business necessity' and 'job
related' are intended to reflect the concepts enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and in other Supreme Court deci-
sions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989)." Id. The legis-
lative history of the portions of the 1991 Act that relate to "business necessity" are
restricted by § 105(b) of the statute:
No statements other than the interpretive memorandum appearing at
Vol. 137 Congressional Record S15276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) shall be
considered legislative history of, or relied upon in any way as legislative
history in construing or applying, any provision of this Act that relates to
Wards Cove-Business necessity/cumulation/alternative business practice.
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claims were cognizable under Title VII was beyond peradventure. 93 Nev-
ertheless, Congress's failure to amend the ADEA merely creates ambiguity
and cannot be relied on as authority for the proposition that Congress was
rejecting disparate impact analysis under the ADEA. 94 Further, the legisla-
tive history of the 1991 Act suggests that some members of Congress in-
tended the amendments to Title VII to apply to antidiscrimination laws
that were modeled after, and interpreted consistently with, Title VII. 95
IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HAZENPAPER Co. v. BIGGINS
A. The Controversy Before Hazen Paper
Prior to the Supreme Court's 1993 decision in Hazen Paper Co. v. Big-
gins,9 6 a large number of courts allowed plaintiffs to use disparate impact
analysis as a means of proving a violation of the ADEA.9 7 Often, courts did
so without questioning the propriety of extending the Title VII doctrine to
age cases.98 Other courts noted that the extension of the disparate impact
93. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 424 (establishing disparate impact analysis). For a
discussion of the history of the disparate impact doctrine, see supra notes 32-37
and accompanying text.
94. See Michael C. Sloan, Comment, Disparate Impact in the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act: Will the Supreme Court Permit It ?, 1995 Wis. L. REv. 507, 518 (finding
it unpersuasive to read into congressional inaction that ADEA was similarly
amended).
95. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 4 (1991). The House Committee on the
Judiciary stated:
A number of other laws banning discrimination, including ... the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act... are modeled after, and have been
interpreted in a manner consistent with Title VII. The Committee in-
tends that these other laws modeled after Title VII be interpreted consist-
ently in a manner consistent [sic] with Title VII as amended by this Act.
Id. (citations omitted); see also 4 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION COORDINATOR
(CBC) 58,522 (Nov. 5, 1996) (stating that Congress intended that amendments
to Title VII would apply to other antidiscrimination laws).
96. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
97. For a discussion of cases which considered the availability of disparate im-
pact under the ADEA before Hazen Paper, see infra notes 98-104 and accompanying
text.
98. See Maresco v. Evans Chemetics, 964 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding that
disparate impact doctrine is applicable in ADEA cases); Bay v. Times Mirror
Magazines, Inc., 936 F.2d 112, 117 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting that "so long as the
employer's decisions ... do not impose a general rule that has a disparate impact
on older workers... its actions are not barred by the ADEA") (citations omitted);
Shutt v. Sandoz Crop Protection Corp., 934 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1991) (same);
Wooden v. Board of Educ., 931 F.2d 376 (6th Cir. 1991) (analyzing plaintiff's
ADEA claim under disparate impact theory without questioning propriety); Mac-
Pherson v. University of Montevallo, 922 F.2d 766, 770-73 (11th Cir. 1991) (al-
lowing plaintiff to assert disparate impact claim without analyzing its propriety in
ADEA cases); Rose v. Wells Fargo & Co., 902 F.2d 1417, 1421 (9th Cir. 1990) (stat-
ing that ADEA plaintiff may proceed under either disparate impact or disparate
treatment theory of liability); Lowe v. Commack Union Free Sch. Dist., 886 F.2d
1364, 1369 (2d Cir. 1989) (same); Holt v. Gamewell Corp., 797 F.2d 36, 37 (1st Cir.
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theory was controversial, but assumed for purposes of the case before
them that the theory was available. 99
In Geller v. Markham,10 0 the Second Circuit held that disparate impact
analysis is appropriate under the ADEA.1°1 The defendant argued that
1986) (same); Palmer v. United States, 794 F.2d 534, 536 (9th Cir. 1986) (same);
Foster v. Arcata Assocs., 772 F.2d 1453, 1458 (9th Cir. 1985) (same); Heward v.
Western Elec. Co., 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 807 (10th Cir. 1984) (same);
Monroe v. United Airlines, Inc., 736 F.2d 394, 404 n.3 (7th Cir. 1984) (rejecting,
without analysis, defendant's argument that "it is questionable whether a plaintiff
may prove violation of the ADEA by showing disparate impact on older workers of
a facially neutral policy"); EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 725 F.2d 211 (3d
Cir. 1983) (allowing plaintiff to rely on disparate impact theory without analyzing
its propriety in ADEA cases); Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686,
690 (8th Cir. 1983) (same); Allison v. Western Union Tel. Co., 680 F.2d 1318, 1322
(11th Cir. 1982) (same); Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 531 n.1 (9th Cir.
1981) (same); Kelly v. American Standard, 640 F.2d 974, 980 n.9 (9th Cir. 1981)
(same); Kennel v. Dover Garage, Inc., 816 F. Supp. 178, 188-91 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 9
F.3d 1536 (2d Cir. 1993) (same); Popko v. City of Clairton, 570 F. Supp. 446, 451
(W.D. Pa. 1983) (stating that ADEA plaintiff may proceed under either disparate
impact or disparate treatment theory of liability); Stone v. Western Air Lines, Inc.,
544 F. Supp. 33, 35 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (same); Grecco v. Spang & Co., 527 F. Supp.
978, 980 (W.D. Pa. 1981), affd, 779 F.2d 44 (3d Cir. 1985) (same); Eason v. Na-
tional Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 512 F. Supp. 1199, 1204 (D.D.C. 1981), affd,
701 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (same).
The assumption in these cases that disparate impact is available under the
ADEA is a result of the similar purpose and language of Title VII and the ADEA
and is consistent with the common practice of importing Title VII standards and
practices into ADEA cases. See, e.g., EEOC v. Borden's, Inc., 724 F.2d 1390, 1394
(9th Cir. 1984) (citing Kauffman v. Sidereal Corp., 695 F.2d 343, 346 n.1 (9th Cir.
1982)) (discussing similarity between ADEA and Title VII as justification for use of
disparate impact under ADEA); Schwager v. Sun Oil Co., 591 F.2d 58, 60 (10th Cir.
1979) (applying Title VII standards in ADEA case).
99. See, e.g., Fisher v. Transco Servs.-Milwaukee, Inc., 979 F.2d 1239, 1244 (7th
Cir. 1992) (choosing not to decide question of availability of disparate impact
under ADEA because even if theory was available, plaintiff failed to make out
prima facie case); Finnegan v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 967 F.2d 1161, 1163 (7th
Cir. 1992) (same); Davidson v. Board of Governors, 920 F.2d 441, 444 (7th Cir.
1990) (same); Arnold v. United States Postal Serv., 863 F.2d 994, 998 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (same); Massarsky v. General Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111, 120 (3d Cir. 1983)
(same); see also Akins v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 744 F.2d 1133, 1136 (5th Cir.
1984) (choosing not to decide question of availability of disparate impact under
ADEA, but remanding and instructing district court to explicitly consider issue).
100. 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980).
101. Id. at 1030. In Geller, a 55 year-old teacher with "considerable experi-
ence" was hired by the defendant school district. Id. After several weeks, the
teacher was replaced by a 25 year-old teacher who had less than five years experi-
ence. Id. The school utilized a salary system that linked salary level to experience.
Id. As a cost-saving measure, the school had a written policy of hiring teachers with
less than five years experience. Id. The plaintiffs statistical expert showed that
92.6% of the teachers in Geller's state who were between ages 40 and 65 had more
than five years teaching experience, while only 62% of the teachers under 40 had
more than five years of experience. Id. The court agreed with Geller's argument
that this policy had a discriminatory impact on persons over age 40 and thus vio-
lated the ADEA. Id. at 1034. For a discussion of Justice Rehnquist's dissent to the
denial of certiorari in this case, which has become an important authority on this
issue, see infra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
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"principles with respect to discriminatory racist impact in violation of Title
VII should not govern age discrimination cases."10 2 The Geller court,
along with other courts, rejected this argument by holding that the exten-
sion of disparate impact analysis to the ADEA is logical, because disparate
impact is available as a means of proving discrimination under Title VII,
and the language and purpose of Title VII and the ADEA are almost iden-
tical.103 The Geller court's reasoning has supplied the major argument in
favor of the extension of disparate impact to the ADEA.10 4
In Markham v. Geller,10 5 the Supreme Court decided not to review the
decision of the Second Circuit. 10 6 In a dissenting opinion to the denial of
Fourteen years later, in EEOC v. Francis W. Parker School 41 F.3d 1073 (7th Cir.
1994), on almost identical facts, the Seventh Circuit held that disparate impact
claims are not available under the ADEA. For a discussion of Parker, see infra notes
151-62 and accompanying text.
102. Geller, 635 F.2d at 1032.
103. Id. The Second Circuit relied on language from the Supreme Court:
"'the (substantive) prohibitions of the ADEA were derived in haec verba from Title
VII.' Id. (quoting Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978)). The court found
that the question of disparate impact as a means of proving a violation was substan-
tive and therefore must have been adopted in the ADEA. Id. The court stated
"[a] lthough the ADEA did not adopt Title VII's procedural rules entirely, the rule
permitting a case to be established by a showing of discriminatory impact or treat-
ment cannot reasonably be viewed as merely procedural." Id. (citing Oscar Mayer
Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 755-56 (1979)); see also Abbott v. Federal Forge, Inc.,
912 F.2d 867, 872 (6th Cir. 1990) (relying on Geller to hold that disparate impact is
available under ADEA); EEOC v. Borden's, Inc., 724 F.2d 1390, 1394 (9th Cir.
1984) (stating that "the similar language, structure, and purpose of Title VII and
the ADEA, as well as the similarity of the analytic problems posed in interpreting
the two statutes, has led us to adopt disparate impact in cases under the ADEA");
Reilly v. Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 653 F. Supp. 725, 729 (D.N.J. 1987)
(same); Franci v. Avco Corp., 538 F. Supp. 250, 255 (D. Conn. 1982) (relying on
Geller and similar language of ADEA and Title VII for conclusion that disparate
impact is available under ADEA).
Several commentators have documented the parallel provisions of Title VII
and the ADEA and have concluded, for that reason, that the extension of the dis-
parate impact theory is a logical step. See ARTHUR LARSON & LEx K. LARSON, 3A
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: AGE, HANDICAP, AT-WILL EXCEPTIONS AND APPENDI-
CES § 102.43, at 21-342 (1993) (finding that ADEA and Title VII prohibitions are
generally parallel and that Title VII precedents should therefore apply to ADEA);
Kaminshine, supra note 14, at 299 (same). For a discussion of the similar language
of the statutes, see supra notes 58-70 and accompanying text. Interpretive regula-
tions issued by the EEOC also stated that disparate impact analysis is appropriate
under the ADEA. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(d) (1993).
104. See, e.g., Eglit, supra note 77, at 210 (noting that many courts apply dispa-
rate impact analysis to ADEA); Kaminshine, supra note 14, at 231 (discussing
"cross-referencing" of Title VII and ADEA); Note, Disparate Impact Analysis and the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 68 MINN. L. REV. 1038, 1045-65 (1984) (ex-
plaining rationale for applying disparate impact analysis to ADEA); Peter H. Har-
ris, Note, Age Discrimination, Wages, and Economics: What Judicial Standard?, 13 HARv.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 715, 720-21 (1990) (arguing that legislative history does not pre-
clude use of disparate impact under ADEA).
105. 451 U.S. 945 (1981).
106. Id.
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the petition for certiorari, then Justice Rehnquist set forth several argu-
ments against the use of disparate impact analysis under the ADEA. 1° 7
Justice Rehnquist argued that the use of factors other than age in employ-
ment decisions, regardless of how high the correlation was between those
factors and the employee's age, could not support liability under the
ADEA.10 8 Justice Rehnquist further argued that cost is a "reasonable fac-
tor other than age," and thus an employer who bases its decision on cost
can avoid liability by invoking the affirmative defense provided in the stat-
ute, regardless of the disparate impact on older workers. 10 9 While Justice
Rehnquist did not expressly state that disparate impact could never be
invoked in an ADEA case, his dissent has been used to support that
proposition. 1 10
In Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc.,111 Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals dissented in a case where the majority had imposed
liability on an employer for terminating an employee because of a high
salary.1 12 Judge Easterbrook's dissent focused on the majority's holding
that characteristics which are correlated with age can support disparate
impact liability under the disparate treatment model. 1 13 After criticizing
107. Id. at 945-49 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Nu-
merous commentators had questioned the propriety of the use of disparate impact
in ADEA cases for many years. See, e.g., Mack A. Player, Proof of Disparate Treatment
Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Variations on a Title VII Theme, 17 GA.
L. REv. 621 (1983) (arguing that disparate impact is inconsistent with purposes of
ADEA); SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 29, at 505-06 (arguing that disparate im-
pact is not available under ADEA).
108. Markham, 451 U.S. at 948 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certio-
rari). Justice Rehnquist wrote his dissent 12 years before the Court unanimously
decided in Hazen Paper that employment decisions based on factors that have a
high correlation with age do not violate the ADEA. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,
507 U.S. 604, 608-09 (1993). For a discussion of Hazen Paper, see infta notes 117-28
and accompanying text.
109. Markham, 451 U.S. at 948-49 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari). The "reasonable factors other than age" defense is codified at 29
U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1994). For a discussion of this defense, see supra notes 71-83
and accompanying text.
110. See Markham, 451 U.S. at 948 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) ("This court has never held that proof of discriminatory impact can
establish a violation of the ADEA.").
111. 828 F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1987).
112. Id. at 1211-22 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). In Metz, a 54 year-old plant
manager was discharged after 27 years of employment. Id. at 1203 (Easterbrook,
J., dissenting). The defendant asserted that the plaintiff was terminated because of
his high salary and that the ADEA does not prohibit such a decision. Id. (Easter-
brook, J., dissenting). The district court agreed. Id. (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
On appeal, the majority stated: "The sole issue ... is whether the salary savings that
can be realized by replacing a single employee in the ADEA age-protected range
with a younger, lower-salaried employee constitutes a permissible, nondiscrimina-
tory justification for the replacement." Id. at 1205 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
The majority concluded that the employer had used salary as a proxy for age and
thus had violated the ADEA. Id. at 1210-11 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 1212-13 (Easterbrook,J., dissenting).
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the majority for merging the disparate treatment and disparate impact
theories, Judge Easterbrook was compelled to consider both theories. 114
On the basis of a detailed analysis of the ADEA, Judge Easterbrook con-
cluded: "[t]he language, structure, and history of the ADEA have led
thoughtful people to conclude ... that disparate impact analysis is inappli-
cable in ADEA cases."1 15 Therefore, before Hazen Paper, a considerable
number of courts questioned the propriety of extending disparate impact
analysis to the ADEA.116
B. The Hazen Paper Decision
In Hazen Paper, the Supreme Court held that an employer is not liable
under the ADEA when the factor motivating the employer's decision is
something other than the employee's age. 117 The Hazen Paper Court
114. Id. at 1214-15 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). Judge Easterbrook stated:
The two methods of proof should be kept separate. They are built on
different premises: disparate treatment on the premise that employees
are identical, so that differential treatment must be attributed to use of
the prohibited characteristic, and disparate impact on the premise that
because of a history of discrimination employees are different, so that
employers must be prevented from using arbitrary tests and devices that
play on that regrettable difference without advancing any legitimate in-
terest. Putting the two theories together yields nothing but confusion.
Id. at 1215 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 1220 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (citing Albert Callile, Three Devel-
oping Issues of the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 54 DET.J. URB.
L. 431, 444 (1977); Stacey, supra note 16, at 437; Note, The Cost Defense Under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 1982 DUKE L.J. 580).
116. See, e.g., Finnegan v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 967 F.2d 1161, 1163 (7th
Cir. 1992) (questioning "whether disparate impact has ever been a viable theory of
age discrimination"); EEOC v. Atlantic Community Sch. Dist., 879 F.2d 434, 437
(8th Cir. 1989) (rejecting jury instruction tendered by EEOC that would have re-
quired "finding of age discrimination whenever an applicant 40 and over is not
hired by an employer who has agreed to pay salaries based on experience");
Dorsch v. L.B. Foster Co., 782 F.2d 1421, 1428 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating that "[t]he
adverse impact analysis developed in Title VII cases cannot be extended easily to
age cases"); Diamantopulos v. Brookside Corp., 683 F. Supp. 322, 328 (D. Conn.
1988) (finding that where defendant declined to hire plaintiff because his salary
demands were too high, employer's reason was justifiable and stating that "[w] here
economic considerations are not a proxy for age ... such factors may constitute
legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons justifying an employer's actions"); Cunning-
ham v. Central Beverage, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 59, 62 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (noting that
"the disparate impact analysis in race cases cannot be extended easily to age
cases"); Mastie v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 424 F. Supp. 1299, 1318 (E.D. Mich.
1976) (concluding that "higher labor costs associated with the employment of
older employees constitute 'reasonable factors other than age' which an employer
can consider"); cf Donnelly v. Exxon Research & Eng'g Co., 12 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 417, 422 (D.N.J. 1974) (noting that "it was not the purpose of the
[ADEA] to maintain anyone in any position where the salary of the position was
beyond the value of the services"), affd, 521 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1975).
117. 507 U.S. 604, 608-09 (1993). In Hazen Paper, a 63 year-old employee was
terminated a few weeks before his pension benefits would have vested. Id. at 606-
07. The Court held that the discharge of an employee to prevent the vesting of
pension benefits did not violate the ADEA. Id. at 608-15. In such a case, the em-
[Vol. 41: p. 15271556
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found that the ADEA was enacted because of Congress's concern that
older workers were being deprived of employment on the basis of "inaccu-
rate and stigmatizing stereotypes."'" 8 The Court reasoned that policies
that correlate with age, but are not themselves age-based, are not prohib-
ited by the ADEA because inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes are not
implicated."19
The Hazen Paper case was, by its own terms, a disparate treatment
case. °2 0 The Court granted certiorari to settle a split in the circuit courts
regarding the question of whether employment decisions made on the
basis of factors that had a high correlation with age-such as salary and
pension status-were sufficient to support liability in a disparate treatment
case. 12 1 The Court's reasoning and decision, however, also had a signifi-
cant effect on the future of disparate impact analysis under the ADEA. 122
ployer's decision is not based on the employee's age; therefore, the employer does
not violate the ADEA. Id.
The Court's decision settled a split among the circuits. For a further discus-
sion of the circuit court cases leading up to Hazen Paper, see supra notes 98-116 and
accompanying text. The Court noted: "[wie do not mean to suggest that an em-
ployer lawfully could fire an employee in order to prevent his pension benefits
from vesting. Such conduct is actionable under § 510 of ERISA." Hazen Paper, 507
U.S. at 611-13. For a detailed discussion of the Hazen Paper case, see Thomas
Brown & Randell Montellaro, Pension Interference Does Not Constitute Violation of the
ADEA: Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 19 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 187 (1993-94) and
Mitchell, supra note 21, at 675.
118. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 609-11. The Court's decision was based on its
finding that "an employee's age is analytically distinct from his years of service." Id.
at 611. For a discussion of the stated purposes of the ADEA, see supra note 68.
119. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 611 ("When the employer's decision is wholly
motivated by factors other than age, the problem of inaccurate and stigmatizing
stereotypes disappears. This is true even if the motivating factor is correlated with
age .... ).
120. Id. at 609-11. The Hazen Paper opinion carefully defines "disparate treat-
ment" and "disparate impact" as separate concepts and states that the case before
the Court is a disparate treatment case. Id. at 609. The Court stated: "we long
have distinguished between 'disparate treatment' and 'disparate impact' theories
of employment discrimination." Id.
121. Compare White v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 862 F.2d 56 (3d Cir. 1988)
(finding that firing of older employee to avoid liability for pension benefits vio-
lated ADEA), and Metz v. Transit Mix, 828 F.2d 1202, 1208 (7th Cir. 1987) (hold-
ing that use of salary as proxy for age when making employment decision violated
ADEA), with EEOC v. Clay Printing Co., 955 F.2d 936, 942 (4th Cir. 1992) (noting
that age and years of service are distinct); Bay v. Times Mirror Magazines, Inc., 936
F.2d 112, 117 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that nothing in ADEA prohibits employer
from using cost as part of employment decision even though "high salary and age
may be related"), and Williams v. General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 120, 131 n.17
(5th Cir. 1981) (declaring that seniority and age discrimination are unrelated); see
also Metz, 828 F.2d at 1212 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (arguing that cost is valid
reason for terminating employees, regardless of disparate impact such an ap-
proach may have on persons over forty). See generally Sloan, supra note 94, at 530-
33 (discussing cases leading up to Hazen Paper).
122. See Sloan, supra note 94, at 539-43 (discussing importance of Hazen Paper
decision to disparate impact question).
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In a disparate impact case, the employee is not claiming that the dis-
puted employment policy was enacted because of discriminatory animus-
that is a disparate treatment case.' 23 By definition, a disparate impact
claim challenges employment policies that are neutral in regard to pro-
tected characteristics. 12 4 The reasoning of the post-Hazen Paper courts
which have held that disparate impact analysis is not available in ADEA
cases can be summarized as follows: (1) Hazen Paper held that the ADEA
only prohibits actions that are actually motivated by age and (2) in a dispa-
rate impact claim, by definition, the employer's decision is wholly moti-
vated by factors other than age.1 25 Therefore, Hazen Paper necessitates the
conclusion that disparate impact claims are not cognizable under the
iDEA.1 26
Hazen Paper also dispelled the assumption that Title VII doctrines can
be imported into the ADEA without question.1 2 7 Prior cases which held
123. See, e.g., Metz 828 F.2d at 1215 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (finding that
"all the disparate impact cases reflect the belief that disparate impact and intent
are different").
124. For a discussion of the disparate treatment and disparate impact theories
of employment discrimination, see supra notes 28-37 and accompanying text.
125. See Allen v. Diebold, Inc., 33 F.3d 674, 676 (6th Cir. 1994) (explaining
that Hazen Paper holds "that the ADEA prohibits only actions actually motivated by
age and does not constrain an employer who acts on the basis of other factors-
pension status, seniority, wage rate-that are empirically correlated with age"); see
also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (imposing liability because of dispa-
rate impact of employer's facially neutral policy); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (same). For a general discussion of the disparate impact
theory, see supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
126. See EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1076 (7th Cir. 1994)
("[T]he [Hazen Paper] Court's examination of the ADEA is instructive here."). But
see EEOC v. Local 350, Plumbers and Pipefitters, 998 F.2d 641, 648 n.2 (9th Cir.
1993) (amending original opinion to note that Hazen Paper decision does not pre-
clude use of disparate impact analysis); EEOC v. Newport Mesa Unif. Sch. Dist.,
893 F. Supp. 927, 930 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (criticizing Seventh Circuit's conclusion
that after Hazen Paper, disparate impact theory cannot exist under ADEA). For a
discussion of cases which have addressed this issue after Hazen Paper, see infra notes
130-94 and accompanying text.
127. See Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989 (5th Cir. 1996) (discuss-
ing differences between Title VII and ADEA and concluding that Title VII princi-
ples should not be automatically imported into ADEA cases); DiBiase v.
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 734 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that "dispa-
rate impact theory should not be applied [in ADEA cases] as a matter of course");
Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 312 (6th Cir. 1975) (noting "[tihat the
[ADEA] is embodied in a separate act and has its own unique history at least coun-
sel the examiner to consider the particular problems sought to be reached by the
statute"); see also Stacey, supra note 16, at 445-47 (listing differences between ADEA
and Title VII).
On several other occasions, the Supreme Court has refused to allow the use of
the disparate impact theory in employment discrimination legislation other than
Title VII. See, e.g., General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375,
389-91 (1982) (finding that legislative history of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 shows that Con-
gress intended only to proscribe intentional discrimination and did not intend to
allow recovery for disparate impact); Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272
1558 [Vol. 41: p. 1527
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that disparate impact was available under the ADEA must, at least, be
reconsidered. 12 8
V. A PLURALITY OF CIRcUITs HAVE REJECTED DisPARATE IMPACT ANALYSIS
UNDER THE ADEA AFTER HA zENPAPER
The Hazen Paper Court specifically refused to decide whether dispa-
rate impact analysis is available under the ADEA. 129 Since the Hazen Paper
decision, however, a considerable number of courts have addressed this
issue. This Section surveys the current state of the law on this question in
each circuit.
A. Circuit Courts Which Continue to Allow Disparate Impact Liability Under
the ADEA
In post-Hazen Paper opinions, the First Circuit noted that the availabil-
ity of disparate impact in age cases is controversial, but assumed, argu-
endo, that the theory is available.13 0 The Fifth and Eighth Circuits have
continued to allow disparate impact age discrimination cases without anal-
(1979) (finding that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was not intended to allow for recovery for
disparate impact).
128. See, e.g., DiBiase, 48 F.3d at 733 n.20 (finding that Hazen Paper disposes of
assumption "that interpretations of the ADEA parallel interpretations of Title
VII"); EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 725 F.2d 211 (3d Cir. 1983) (premising
opinion on belief that termination of employees because of their eligibility for
early retirement violated ADEA); Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d
686, 690 (8th Cir. 1983) (allowing plaintiff to use disparate impact theory after
deciding that termination based on high salary could support ADEA claim).
129. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993). Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Thomas concurred in the majority opinion
on the understanding that the Court did not reach the disparate impact issue. Id.
at 617-18. Justice Kennedy stated:
[N]othing in the Court's opinion should be read as incorporating in the
ADEA context the so-called "disparate impact" theory of Title VII ....
[W]e have not yet addressed the question whether such a claim is cogni-
zable under the ADEA, and there are substantial arguments that it is im-
proper to carry over disparate impact analysis from Title VII to the ADEA.
Id. at 618 (citations omitted).
130. See Graffam v. Scott Paper Co., 60 F.3d 809 (1st Cir. 1995) (unpublished
table decision), available at No. 95-1046, 1995 WL 414831, at *3 (1st Cir. July 14,
1995) (stating that "for purposes of this opinion, we assume arguendo that the
district court correctly held that the ADEA supports a claim for age discrimination
based on a disparate impact theory of liability"). The First Circuit ruled that even
though the plaintiff showed that the employer's reduction in force had a disparate
impact on persons over age 40, the employer showed that the procedures chosen
were job related and consistent with business necessity. Id.; see also LeBlanc v.
Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836 (1st Cir. 1993) (allowing disparate impact claim
without discussion); Holt v. Gamewell Corp., 797 F.2d 36, 37 (1st Cir. 1986)
(same); Caron v. Scott Paper Co., 834 F. Supp. 33, 35-38 (D. Me. 1993) (stating
that Supreme Court has never decided whether disparate impact theory applies in
age cases and arguing that theory should be available). For a further discussion of
the Caron case, see infra notes 139-50 and accompanying text.
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ysis.13 1 The Second, Sixth and Ninth Circuits have taken the approach
that because the disparate impact theory was available under the ADEA
before Hazen Paper, and Hazen Paper did not preclude its use, the theory is
still available. 132 No circuit court has analyzed this issue and clearly held
131. See Houghton v. Sipco, Inc., 38 F.3d 953, 958-59 (8th Cir. 1994) (apply-
ing disparate impact theory without analysis); EEOC v. General Dynamics Corp.,
999 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1993) (reversing district court's exclusion of expert witness's
disparate impact analysis without analyzing whether disparate impact was avail-
able); see also Day v. Board of Regents, 911 F. Supp. 1228, 1248 n.26 (D. Neb. 1995)
(stating that there is "'some doubt about the viability of an ADEA disparate impact
claim,"' but assuming that theory is available because pre-Hazen Paper Eighth Cir-
cuit cases allowed it and Hazen Paper does not preclude such claims) (quoting Lei-
dig v. Honeywell, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 796 (D. Minn. 1994)); Webb v. Derwinski, 868
F. Supp. 1184 (E.D. Mo. 1994) (recognizing controversy regarding availability of
disparate impact, but assuming theory is available); Leidig, 850 F. Supp. at 801
(same). The pre-Hazen Paper cases include Nolting v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 799
F.2d 1192 (8th Cir. 1986) (allowing disparate impact claim in age case), and
Leftwich, 702 F.2d at 690 (same). For a discussion of cases which addressed the
availability of disparate impact liability before Hazen Paper, see supra notes 98-116
and accompanying text.
The D.C. Circuit has not addressed the question of the availability of disparate
impact under the ADEA in a post-Hazen Paper case. See Arnold v. United States
Postal Serv., 863 F.2d 994, 996 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (noting controversy regarding
availability of disparate impact, but assuming that theory applies); see also Csicseri v.
Bowsher, 862 F. Supp. 547, 574 (D.D.C. 1994) (stating that D.C. Circuit has not
decided issue).
The approach in the Fourth Circuit is unclear. In Fisher v. Asheville-Bucombe
Technology Community College, 857 F. Supp. 465, 468 (W.D.N.C. 1993), a district
court allowed an ADEA plaintiff to proceed on a disparate impact claim. Id. The
court noted that it had "some reservations" about the availability of the theory
because the Fourth Circuit had not mentioned it in its recent ADEA opinions. Id.
(citing Tuck v. Henkel Corp., 973 F.2d 371 (4th Cir. 1992); EEOC v. Clay Printing
Co., 955 F.2d 936 (4th Cir. 1992)).
The Eleventh Circuit has also not decided whether disparate impact liability
for age discrimination survived Hazen Paper. Older Eleventh Circuit cases allowed
disparate impact claims. See MacPherson v. University of Montevallo, 922 F.2d 766
(l1th Cir. 1991) (allowing disparate impact age claim without analysis).
132. See Lyon v. Ohio Educ. Assoc. & Prof'l Staff Union, 53 F.3d 135, 139 n.5
(6th Cir. 1995) (noting controversy but stating that circuit law prior to Hazen Paper
supports disparate impact claims under ADEA (citing Abbott v. Federal Forge, 912
F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1990)); Kennel v. Dover Garage, Inc., 816 F. Supp. 178 (E.D.N.Y.
1993) (allowing disparate impact analysis); see also Brothers v. NCR Corp., 885 F.
Supp. 1043, 1049 (N.D. Ohio 1995) (stating that "[a]bsent express statutory lan-
guage prohibiting the use of disparate impact in age discrimination cases, or a
clear holding from the Supreme Court or the Sixth Circuit disallowing its use, a
plaintiff may establish a violation of the ADEA by [proving the elements of a dispa-
rate impact claim]").
The Ninth Circuit has refused to apply Hazen Paper as a bar to disparate im-
pact claims. See EEOC v. Newport Mesa Unif. Sch. Dist., 893 F. Supp. 927, 930
(C.D. Cal. 1995) (finding contention that Hazen Paper precludes use of disparate
impact is incorrect); see also Nanayakkara v. California State Univ., 60 F.3d 834 (9th
Cir. 1995) (analyzing elements of prima facie disparate impact claim under ADEA
without addressing availability of theory); McCann v. Secretary of the Navy, No. C-
94-1491, 1995 WL 317005, at *11 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 1995) (applying disparate
impact theory without questioning propriety); McMillan v. TNT Bestway Transp.,
Inc., No. C-93-20407, 1994 WL 665382, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 1994) (affirming
1560
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that disparate impact claims are cognizable after Hazen Paper.133 Several
district courts have analyzed the issue, however, and have decided that
disparate impact is available under the ADEA.13 4
In Brothers v. NCR Corp.,' 3 5 the District Court for the Northern District
of Ohio rejected the argument that disparate impact liability was not avail-
able under the ADEA.13 6 The plaintiffs disparate impact claim was dis-
missed because of a failure of proof.13 7 Before dismissing the claim,
however, the court stated that because disparate impact claims were avail-
able under the ADEA before the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and Hazen Paper,
and because neither the statute nor the Supreme Court's decision pre-
cluded disparate impact, disparate impact claims are cognizable under the
ADEA.138
In Caron v. Scott Paper Co.,139 a district court in Maine considered and
rejected arguments for limiting disparate impact analysis to Title VII. 40
district court's exclusion of expert witness's disparate impact analysis without ana-
lyzing whether disparate impact was available); Piper v. J.R. Simplot Co., No. 93-
35011, 1994 WL 183335, at *5-6 (9th Cir. May 12, 1994) (same).
133. See, e.g., EEOC v. Local 350, Plumbers and Pipefitters, 998 F.2d 641, 648
n.2 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that disparate impact is available in ADEA cases).
Shortly before Hazen Paper, the Local 350 court decided that an age discrimination
plaintiff could proceed on a disparate impact theory. Id. After Hazen Paper, the
defendant requested reconsideration. Id. The court rejected the defendant's re-
quest, stating: "we perceive no conflict between [Hazen Paper] ... and our decision
in this case." Id.
134. For a discussion of cases which have held that disparate impact is avail-
able under the ADEA, see supra notes 130-33, infra notes 135-50 and accompanying
texts.
135. 885 F. Supp. 1043 (N.D. Ohio 1995).
136. Id. at 1049. In Brothers, a salesman was terminated allegedly because of
his failure to meet sales quotas. Id. at 1046. The plaintiff claimed that he was
discriminated against because of age, and he advanced both disparate treatment
and disparate impact claims. Id. at 1047-48.
137. Id. at 1049. The plaintiff failed to identify a specific employment prac-
tice which had a disparate impact or to present statistical evidence showing proof
of disparate impact. Id.
138. Id. The court disposed of the defendant's arguments against disparate
impact analysis:
Although the Civil Rights Act of 1991 neither expressly approves nor dis-
approves the use of a disparate impact theory to establish a violation of
the ADEA, and the Supreme Court has refrained from deciding whether
the disparate impact theory is available under the ADEA, prior to [Hazen
Paper], plaintiffs in the Sixth Circuit have been permitted to use the dis-
parate impact theory developed in cases brought under Title VII ....
Absent express statutory language prohibiting the use of disparate impact
in age discrimination cases, or a clear holding from the Supreme Court
or the Sixth Circuit disallowing its use, a plaintiff may establish a violation
of the ADEA [by proving the elements of a disparate impact claim].
Id. (citations omitted).
139. 834 F. Supp. 33 (D. Me. 1993).
140. Id. at 36-39. Caron arose out of a reduction in force. Id. at 34. The
employer had selected the employees it would terminate through a largely subjec-
tive evaluation. Id. at 34-35. The plaintiffs, who were all over age 50, claimed that
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The court noted that several circuit courts which had addressed this issue
had allowed disparate impact age claims.14 1 The court began its analysis
by noting that the Supreme Court had "never decided whether a disparate
impact theory of liability is available under the ADEA."'
42
The defendants argued that disparate impact analysis should not be
extended to the ADEA because the theory was created to protect groups
which had suffered a history of discrimination.1 4 3 The defendants con-
cluded that because older people had not been subject to a history of dis-
crimination on the basis of immutable characteristics, disparate impact
analysis should not be available under the ADEA. 144
The court rejected this argument, stating that it was "based on a mis-
understanding of the development of the [disparate impact] theory."'1 45
The court found that the impact of discrimination, and not the motivation
for it, was the evil Congress prohibited in Title VII.146 The court also
noted that the Supreme Court had not required other protected groups,
such as women, to show a history of discrimination similar to that suffered
by African-Americans before availing themselves of the disparate impact
theory.147
As further support for its conclusion, the court first interpreted the
phrase "it shall be unlawful for an employer ... [to] otherwise adversely
affect... status as an employee because of such individual's age" as au-
the employer's layoff policy had a disparate impact on older workers. Id. The
plaintiffs pointed to the fact that the employer's downsizing process had resulted
in retention of 61.5% of employees who were over age 50 and retention of 91.5%
of employees under age 50. Id.
141. Id. (citing Palmer v. United States, 794 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1986); Monroe
v. United Airlines, Inc., 736 F.2d 394, 404 n.3 (7th Cir. 1984); Heward v. Western
Elec. Co., 35 Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 807 (10th Cir. 1984); Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe
State College, 702 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1983); Allison v. Western Union Tel. Co., 680
F.2d 1318 (11th Cir. 1982); Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980);
Laugeson v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 316 (6th Cir. 1975)).
142. Caron, 834 F. Supp. at 33 (citing Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S.
604, 610 (1993)).
143. Id. at 37. The defendants argued that "the rationale adopted by the
Supreme Court in Griggs was that if facially neutral factors operated to disadvan-
tage racial minorities, it could be presumed that it was because past societal dis-
crimination created a discriminatory status quo which the neutral factors were
perpetuating." Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. "Examination of the Supreme Court's early disparate impact cases
show that its reasoning was not based on past discrimination." Id.
146. Id. "'Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of em-
ployment practices, not simply the motivation."' Id. (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)).
147. Id. (citing Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977)). In Dothard, the
Supreme Court allowed a woman to assert a disparate impact sex discrimination
claim. Id. "In doing so, the Supreme Court never discussed past discrimination
but simply concentrated on the adverse effects of the employment policy on mem-
bers of a protected group." Id.
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thorization of disparate impact liability.148 Second, the court rejected the
defendant's argument that the legislative history of the ADEA reveals an
intent to limit the statute's prohibitions to intentional discrimination. 149
The court concluded by predicting that when the First Circuit and the
Supreme Court are squarely faced with this issue, both will hold that dispa-
rate impact analysis is available under the ADEA.15°
B. Circuit Courts Which Have Held that Disparate Impact Claims Are Not
Cognizable Under the ADEA
In EEOC v. Francis W Parker School,151 the Seventh Circuit held, in
essence, that disparate impact analysis is not appropriate in ADEA
cases. 152 The majority reasoned that the ADEA requires the employer to
148. Id. The court found that the language of the ADEA "not only prohibits
intentional age discrimination but also forbids any policy having a more harmful
effect on older people than on their co-workers." Id. at 38. For a detailed discus-
sion of the text of the ADEA, see supra notes 58-70 and accompanying text.
149. Caron, 834 F. Supp. at 37. The court rejected the argument that the
Secretary of Labor implicitly recommended that only disparate treatment claims
would be available under the ADEA. Id. For a detailed discussion of the Secre-
tary's Report and the legislative history of the ADEA, see supra notes 40-57 and
accompanying text.
150. Caron, 834 F. Supp. at 38.
151. 41 F.3d 1073 (7th Cir. 1994), cert denied, 115 S. Ct. 2577 (1995).
152. Id. at 1077. Parker arose out of the rejection of an applicant for a teach-
ing position. Id. at 1075. Under a collective bargaining agreement between the
school and its faculty association, teachers' salary levels were determined by a
"step" system, wherein each year of teaching experience commanded a higher sal-
ary. Id. The school's principal decided that the school could not afford a teacher
whose experience would command a salary higher than $28,000, and thus any can-
didate with more than seven years of teaching experience was disqualified. Id.
The plaintiff, who claimed to have 30 years of teaching experience, was not
selected for the position. Id. One of the reasons given for the decision was that
Parker could not afford the high salary that the plaintiff commanded under the
step system. Id. The EEOC brought an action against Parker on the plaintiffs
behalf, alleging that the decision not to hire him violated the ADEA. Id. The suit
included disparate treatment and disparate impact claims. Id. The district court,
relying heavily on the Supreme Court's opinion in Hazen Paper, dismissed all of the
claims at the summaryjudgment stage. Id. The EEOC only appealed the dismissal
of the disparate impact claim. Id.
The Parker court stated that "decisions based on criteria which merely tend to
affect workers over the age of forty more adversely than workers under forty are
not prohibited." Id. at 1077 (citing Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d
1120 (7th Cir. 1993)). The Seventh Circuit had addressed this question several
times. See Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 828 F.2d 1202, 1204 (7th Cir. 1987) (allowing
plaintiff to rely on disparate impact theory).
Writing in dissent, Judge Cudahy noted that "the majority stops ever so slightly
short of ... announcing [that Hazen Paper precludes the use of the disparate im-
pact theory of liability under the ADEA] with perfect clarity. But that is the unmis-
takable import of the majority approach." Parker, 41 F.3d at 1078 (Cudahy, J.,
dissenting). Subsequent decisions in the Seventh Circuit have relied on Parker as
authority for the proposition that a disparate impact claim is not cognizable under
the ADEA. See Caponigro v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., No. 93C0647, 1995 WL
238655, at *9 n.8 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 1995) (citing Gehring v. Case Corp., 43 F.3d
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ignore an employee's age when making hiring decisions and that the stat-
ute provides a remedy when employment decisions are motivated by stere-
otypical beliefs about older workers. 153 The statute, however, does not
require the employer to ignore any other characteristics.15 4 Therefore,
under the ADEA as interpreted by the Hazen Paper Court, a decision by an
employer which was motivated by any factor other than age cannot result
in liability. 155
As further support for its conclusion, the Parker majority discussed the
affirmative defense provided in the ADEA for employment decisions moti-
vated by "reasonable factors other than age." 15 6 The majority advanced
340, 342 (7th Cir. 1994)) ("It is well established in this circuit... that '[a] claim of
age discrimination premised upon the theory that a reduction in force had a dispa-
rate impact upon older employees is without merit."');Jacquez v. Diameters Corp.,
No. 93-C0986, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4012, at *21 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 1995) (citing
EEOC v Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073 (7th Cir. 1994)) (noting that
"[w]hile ... the Supreme Court is undecided, the Seventh Circuit recently held
that disparate impact analysis is not appropriate in age discrimination cases");
Lubkeman v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 877 F. Supp. 1180, 1185 (N.D. Ill. 1995)
(stating that Seventh Circuit has continuously rejected use of disparate impact the-
ory in ADEA cases); cf. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 883 F. Supp. 211, 214-15
(N.D. Ill. 1995) (noting that Seventh Circuit has not extended disparate impact
analysis to age cases and stating that there is "strong dicta" from that court against
disparate impact age discrimination claims).
153. Parker, 41 F.3d at 1076. Following the reasoning in Hazen Paper, Judge
Bauer stated that "inaccurate stereotyping of the eldery was 'the essence of what
Congress sought to prohibit in the ADEA."' Id. (quoting Hazen Paper Co. v. Big-
gins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993)). Judge Bauer stated that this was "[c]ritical to the
[Hazen Paper] Court's analysis." Id. Examples of such stereotypical beliefs include
beliefs that older workers are slower, less efficient or less productive. See id. (ex-
plaining that reliance on such factors is illegal under ADEA).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1076-77. If the employer is wholly motivated by factors other than
age, even if the motivating characteristic is correlated with age, the statute does not
provide a remedy because "'the problem of inaccurate and stigmatizing stereo-
types disappears."' Id. at 1076 (quoting Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 611). The Parker
majority interpreted the Hazen Paper decision as leading to the conclusion that the
Seventh Circuit reached in an earlier case "decisions based on criteria which
merely tend to affect workers over the age of forty more adversely than workers
under the age of forty are not prohibited [by the ADEA]." Id. at 1077 (citing
Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120 (7th Cir. 1993)). This reason-
ing is borne out by another statement from the Hazen Paper opinion: "age and
years of service are analytically distinct, an employer can take account of one while
ignoring the other, and thus it is incorrect to say that a decision based on years of
service is necessarily 'age-based."' Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 611. The Parker court
stated that Hazen Paper did not violate the ADEA because its decision to fire Big-
gins was not based on misperceptions about the competence of older workers.
Parker, 41 F.3d at 1077.
156. Id. The RFOA defense is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 623(0 (1994). For a
discussion of the history and interpretation of the RFOA defense, see supra notes
71-83 and accompanying text.
Highlighting this exception as "particularly noteworthy," the Parker court reaf-
firmed its previous interpretation of this section as authorization for an employer
to make decisions based on factors independent of age, even if those factors have a
high correlation with age. Parker, 41 F.3d at 1077 (citing Anderson, 13 F.3d 1120;
1564 [Vol. 41: p. 1527
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that a "sensible" reading of this section reinforces the conclusion that the
ADEA was enacted only to prohibit decisions based on stereotypes about
age.157
The majority discussed the parallels between Title VII and the ADEA,
rejecting the argument that "because Title VII's prohibitions mirror those
of the ADEA and Title VII permits disparate impact relief, 'similar accept-
ance in ADEA cases' is required."'158 The court stated that "Parker's policy
of linking wages to experience is an economically defensible and reason-
able means of determining salaries."159 These factors, combined with the
Hazen Paper Court's interpretation of the ADEA, led a majority of the court
to conclude that disparate impact claims are not cognizable under the
ADF.
16 0
Metz, 828 F.2d at 1220 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting)). The Seventh Circuit is not
the only court to read this section as a bar to disparate impact claims. See Mark-
ham v. Geller, 451 U.S. 945, 945-49 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of
petition for certiorari).
The Seventh Circuit majority notes that a similar affirmative defense in the
Equal Pay Act, which allows discrepancies in wages paid to men and women based
on "factors other than sex," has been interpreted to preclude disparate impact
claims. Parker, 41 F.3d at 1077 (citing County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S.
161, 170-71 (1981)). The Parker court does not discuss the fact that the ADEA's
affirmative defense is for decisions based on "reasonable factors other than age"
while the defense in the Equal Pay Act is for any "factor other than sex." 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(d) (emphasis added).
157. Parker, 41 F.3d at 1077.
158. Id. Judge Bauer found the dissent's reliance on Title VII precedent to be
"most problematic" although he noted that such reliance is not unprecedented.
Id. For a discussion of the use of Title VII precedent in ADEA cases, see supra
notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
159. Id. at 1078. Although the court appeared to be justifying Parker's ac-
tions under a "business necessity" or "cost" rationale, the court noted, as support
for its proposition, that the ADEA permits an employer to "'observe the terms of a
bona fide seniority system ... which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of
[the ADEA's prohibitions)."' Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)). The court
stated that, in general, "disparate impact theory does not relieve the EEOC of its
obligation to prove the error of the employer's ways." Id.
160. Id. Returning to the Hazen Paper rationale, the majority opinion reiter-
ated that an employment decision based on years of service is not necessarily age-
based, despite the fact that years of service and age may have a high correlation.
Id. The court concluded that a statistical correlation which shows that an em-
ployer's policy has a disproportionally adverse effect on older workers is insuffi-
cient to support liability under the ADEA. Id. The plaintiff who makes this
showing must also show that the reasons given for the policy are pretextual and
that the employer's policy was actually predicated on some "stereotype-based ra-
tionale." Id. This reasoning was based on the Supreme Court's decision in St.
May's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993), which requires a plaintiff claim-
ing disparate treatment to show not only that the reasons an employer offers to
justify an adverse employment decision are false, but also that the true reasons are
discriminatory. See id. at 507-08 (interpreting Title VII to require plaintiff to show
that reason offered by employer for employment decision "was not the true reason
for the employment decision and that race was" once defendant meets burden of
production).
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In Parker, Judge Cudahy dissented on the grounds that the Hazen Pa-
per decision and the RFOA affirmative defense do not preclude the use of
disparate impact analysis under the ADEA.161 Judge Cudahy argued that
disparate impact analysis should be available as a tool for answering the
ultimate question of whether age was a determining factor in an employ-
ment decision that adversely affected the plaintiff.1 62
In Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc.,163 the Tenth Circuit agreed that dispa-
rate impact claims are not cognizable under the ADEA.1 64 The court read
161. Parker, 41 F.3d at 1080 (Cudahy,J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 1079 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). The dissent and the majority agreed
that an employer who offers a pretextual reason for a hiring decision to mask the
fact that the employer was actually relying on stereotypes about older workers vio-
lates the ADEA. Id. at 1078-79 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). Judge Cudahy believed
that the majority incorrectly focused on the underlying theories of ADEA liability,
rather than focusing on permitted methods of proof. Id. at 1079 (Cudahy, J., dis-
senting). Instead, the dissent believed that the disparate impact theory should be
available as a method of proving that the employer's proffered reasons for its hir-
ing decisions are pretextual and that the case should proceed from there. Id. at
1078 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). Judge Cudahy argued that Hazen Paper does not
preclude this possibility. Id. at 1079 (Cudahy, J., dissenting) ("' [W]e do not pre-
clude the possibility that an employer who targets employees with a particular pen-
sion status on the assumption that these employees are likely to be older thereby
engages in age discrimination."') (quoting Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S.
604, 612-13 (1993)). As discussed above, the employee must not only show that
the reasons offered by the employer are false, the employee must also show that
stereotypes about older workers actually drove the employer's decision. Hicks, 509
U.S. at 507-08.
Judge Cudahy believed that to hold otherwise "is to say that 'overqualified'
(i.e. overage) music teachers need not apply." Parker, 41 F.3d at 1078 (Cudahy, J.,
dissenting). Beyond this colorful language, the dissent focused on disparate im-
pact as a method of proof, rather than as a theory of recovery. Id. at 1078-80
(Cudahy, J., dissenting).
The dissent's problem with the majority's opinion is that the majority opinion
begins with its conclusion: that the decision to pass over the plaintiff was not based
on misperceptions about the competence of older workers. Id. at 1078 (Cudahy,
J., dissenting). Judge Cudahy stated that if this characterization was accurate, then
the majority was correct in holding that Hazen Paper precludes ADEA liability. Id.
(Cudahy, J., dissenting). If the decision was not based on misperceptions about
older workers then, under the rule of Hazen Paper, it should not lead to liability.
Id. (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
163. 73 F.3d 999 (10th Cir. 1996).
164. Id. at 1009-10. Ellis arose out of the defendant's failure to hire plaintiffs
as flight attendants. Id. at 1000. The defendant asserted that the plaintiffs were
not hired because they did not meet the airline's weight standards for flight at-
tendants. Id. The defendant's policy required that new-hire flight attendants be
within maximum weight requirements based on their height. Id. at 1001. Incum-
bent flight attendants must remain within weight maximums which are deter-
mined by their height and age-extra weight is allowed as a person ages. Id. The
plaintiffs claimed that defendant's age neutral weight policy for flight attendant
applicants had a disparate impact on older persons. Id. at 1000.
The court initially recognized that the availability of disparate impact analysis
in age cases had not been decided in the Tenth Circuit before this decision. Id. at
1007; see Faulkner v. Super Valu Stores, 3 F.3d 1419, 1428 (10th Cir. 1993) ("The
Tenth Circuit has never directly addressed whether a disparate impact claim is
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the text of the ADEA as indicating an intent to prohibit intentional dis-
crimination, but not incidental and unintentional discrimination that may
result from neutral employment policies. 165 The court recognized that
the statutory language, considered in light of the tradition of interpreting
the ADEA in accordance with Title VII, does not lead to a firm conclusion
of this issue. 16
6
A number of other factors led the court to its conclusion.1 67 First, the
court was persuaded by the fact that the ADEA provides an affirmative
defense when an employer's actions are based on "reasonable factors
cognizable under the ADEA.... [W] e reserve the legal determination of whether
disparate impact is applicable to the ADEA until such time as the issue is properly
presented and argued before this court.").
165. Ellis, 73 F.3d at 1007. The court's textual analysis focused on section
623(a)(1) of the ADEA because this was a failure-to-hire case. Id. at 1007 n.12.
The court refused to "dwell" on the language of section 623(a) (2) because that
section only applies to employees and not to applicants. Id. The court recognized
that the Supreme Court relied on language similar to the language in section
623(a) (2) to create the disparate impact theory. Id. at 1007 (citing Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)). Further, the court recognized that Griggs
involved applicants. Id. at 1007 n.12. The court noted, however, that Congress
amended the relevant portion of Title VII to include applicants, and it did not
similarly amend the ADEA. Id. The court was also persuaded by the fact that both
of the major prohibitory sections of the ADEA end with the phrase "because of
such individual's age," indicating, in the court's view, a congressional intent to
prohibit only intentional discrimination. Id. For a further discussion of the text of
the ADEA, see supra notes 58-83 and accompanying text.
166. Ellis, 73 F.3d at 1007 & n.13.
167. Id. ("[T]he ADEA differs from Title VII in salient ways that counsel
against interpreting the ADEA to recognize disparate impact claims and that rein-
force our reading of the text of the ADEA."). The court found that the pertinent
inquiry is whether the factors which drove Congress to create the disparate impact
theory in Title VII cases also apply in age cases. Id. at 1007 n.13. The court found
that the Griggs Court based its holding on the "larger objectives" underlying Title
VII and not on its text. Id. The court also found that the ADEA and Title VII
differ in these "nontextual" considerations, as well as in text and structure. Id.
In Hiatt v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 859 F. Supp. 1416 (D. Wyo. 1994), afffd on
other grounds, 65 F.3d 838 (10th Cir. 1995), a Wyoming district court held that
disparate impact analysis was not applicable in ADEA cases because the purposes
and policies which support application of the doctrine were not applicable to age
discrimination claims. Id. at 1433-34. The court reasoned that the policies under-
lying the disparate impact doctrine were not germane to ADEA claims because
there is, at some point, a correlation between age and ability. Id. at 1431-37. The
court stated:
While Griggs was rightly concerned with eliminating arbitrary barriers to
employment on the basis of stereotypes that were not relevant to an indi-
vidual's ability to perform a job, there is, at some level, a degree of corre-
lation between age and ability. More importantly for present purposes,
however, is the fact that this correlation cannot be traced to an [sic] his-
tory of past discrimination against these particular individuals who were
previously younger and possibly the beneficiaries of any age discrimina-
tion. In Griggs, the critical fact was the link between the history of educa-
tional discrimination and the use of that discrimination as a means of
presently disadvantaging African-Americans. These concerns simply are
not present when the alleged disparate impact is based on age.
19961 COMMENT 1567
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other than age" and by the Supreme Court's interpretation of a similar
affirmative defense in the Equal Pay Act as a bar to disparate impact
claims. 168 Second, the court found that the legislative history of the ADEA
indicates that while Congress clearly intended to prohibit "arbitrary dis-
crimination," it planned to address situations which would give rise to a
disparate impact claim through programs which would improve opportu-
nities for older workers. 169 The court interpreted the statute to reflect a
disparate treatment and disparate impact dichotomy: while § 623 ad-
dresses arbitrary and invidious discrimination by prohibiting employment
decisions made "because of an individual's age," § 622 addresses the
"more benign problem of disparate impact" through education and re-
search programs. 170
Id. at 1436. The Tenth Circuit expressly declined the opportunity to address the
issue of the availability of disparate impact under the ADEA at that time because
the district court's result could be affirmed on narrower grounds. Hiatt, 65 F.3d at
842.
For further discussion of the differences between age discrimination and the
types of discrimination covered by Title VII, see supra notes 85-88 and accompany-
ing text.
168. Ellis, 73 F.3d at 1008; see 29 U.S.C. § 623(0 (1994) ("It shall not be un-
lawful for an employer... (1) to take any action otherwise prohibited ... where
the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age."). Section
206(d) (1) of the Equal Pay Act provides a defense when an employer's policy is
"based on any other factor other than sex." 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1); see County of
Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 170-71 (1981) (interpreting Equal Pay Act
provision as bar to disparate impact analysis).
The Ellis court did not discuss the fact that the defense in the ADEA is avail-
able when the factors other than age are "reasonable," while the defense in the
Equal Pay Act is available when "any factor" other than sex is the motivation for a
decision. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1) (providing defense when employer relies on
"any other factor other than sex"). For a further discussion of this defense, see
supra notes 71-83 and accompanying text.
169. Ellis, 73 F.3d at 1008.
170. Id. As discussed above, the most coherent source of legislative history on
the ADEA is the report of the Secretary of Labor. Id. The report distinguishes
"arbitrary discrimination" from "problems resulting from factors that 'affect older
workers more strongly, as a group, than they do younger employees."' Id. (citing
Sloan, supra note 94, at 511). The report is interpreted as recommending that
Congress outlaw the former, but that it remedy the latter through programs that
improve opportunities for older workers. Id. The Ellis court, like others, inter-
preted this as a recommendation for a statutory scheme which allows disparate
treatment claims but which does not allow disparate impact claims. Id. For a fur-
ther discussion of the legislative history of the ADEA, see supra notes 40-57 and
accompanying text.
The Ellis court also relied on the stated purposes of the ADEA to reach its
conclusion. Ellis, 73 F.3d at 1009. Section 621 of the ADEA states, in relevant part:
(a) The Congress hereby finds and declares that-
(1) in the face of rising productivity and affluence, older workers
find themselves disadvantaged in their efforts to retain employment...
(2) the setting of arbitrary age limits regardless of potential for job
performance has become a common practice, and certain otherwise de-
sirable practices may work to the disadvantage of older persons . ..
1568 [Vol. 41: p. 1527
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Third, the court found that a comparison of recent amendments of
Title VII and the ADEA indicated that Congress did not intend for dispa-
rate impact to be part of the ADEA statutory scheme. 17 1 Fourth, the court
found that Hazen Paper was a strong indication that the Supreme Court
does not believe that the ADEA contemplates disparate impact liability.172
Fifth, the court saw a "clear trend" in post-Hazen Paper decisions toward
the conclusion that disparate impact claims are not cognizable under the
ADEA.1 73 Finally, the court noted that permitting disparate impact age
discrimination claims would create "practical problems" because the
model is difficult to apply where the protected class is all persons over
forty years-old. 174 The reasoning and conclusion of the Ellis court is in
accord with the Seventh Circuit's decision in Parker-the Ellis decision in-
(4) the existence in industries affecting commerce, of arbitrary dis-
crimination in employment because of age, burdens commerce and the
free flow of goods in commerce.
(b) It is therefore the purpose of this chapter to promote employment of
older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary
age discrimination in employment; to help employers and workers find
ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment.
29 U.S.C. § 621. Considering the fact that the ADEA was drafted before the
Supreme Court established the disparate impact doctrine in Griggs, the Ellis court
may have given the drafters of the statute undue credit for their foresight.
171. Ellis, 77 F.3d at 1008. The court noted that Congress amended Title VII
to include a cause of action for disparate impact claims and made no similar
amendment to the ADEA, despite the fact that it amended other sections of the
ADEA. Id; see Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 115; 105 Star. 1071, 1079 (amending time
period in which ADEA plaintiff may file civil action); id. § 302(2); 105 Stat. at 1088
(extending coverage of ADEA to congressional employees).
172. Ellis, 77 F.3d at 1008-09. The court recognized that the Hazen Paper
Court refused to decide this issue and that the case is technically only a disparate
treatment case, but nonetheless stated: "one cannot read that opinion without re-
ceiving the strong impression that the Supreme Court is suggesting that the ADEA
does not encompass a disparate impact claim." Id. at 1009.
For a further discussion of the Hazen Paper opinion, see supra notes 117-28 and
accompanying text.
173. Ellis, 77 F.3d at 1009 (citing Lyon v. Ohio Educ. Ass'n & Prof'l Staff
Union, 53 F.3d 135, 138-39 (6th Cir. 1995); DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,
48 F.3d 719, 732-34 (3d Cir. 1995); EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073,
1076-77 (7th Cir. 1994)). The court's assertion that DiBiase and Lyon "hold" that
there is no disparate impact claim under the ADEA is questionable. For a further
discussion of the DiBiase case, see infra notes 187-94 and accompanying text.
The Ellis court cited Mangold v. California Public Utilities Commission, 67 F.3d
1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1995) and Houghton v. Sipco, Inc., 38 F.3d 953, 958-59 (8th Cir.
1994) as contrary authority. Ellis, 73 F.3d at 1009.
174. Id. Defining the class that is disparately impacted is difficult because a
policy might have a positive effect on some members of the protected group (i.e.
workers between ages 40 and 50) while it has a disparately adverse effect on other
members of the protected group (i.e. workers over age 50). See Peter H. Schuck,
The Graying of Civil Rights Law: The Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 89 YALE L.J. 27,
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dicates that the Seventh Circuit may have started a trend toward the con-
clusion that disparate impact is not available under the ADEA. 175
C. Mixed Signals from the Third Circuit
The availability of disparate impact liability in age discrimination
cases brought in the Third Circuit is unclear. 176 Third Circuit panels have
affirmed, without opinion, district court rulings which have reached oppo-
site results.177 While one circuit courtjudge has expressed disapproval of
the extension of impact analysis to age cases, the circuit as a whole has not
clearly ruled on the issue. 178
In Maidenbaum v. Bally's Park Place, Inc.,179 the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey held that disparate impact analysis is
applicable in age discrimination cases. 180 The court noted the contro-
.175. For a discussion of the Parker decision, see supra notes 151-62 and accom-
panying text.
176. SeeArmbruster v. Unisys Corp., No. Civ.A. 91-5948, 1996 WL 55659, at *2
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 7, 1996) (citing DiBiase, 48 F.3d at 732-34 (stating that availability of
disparate impact is open question in Third Circuit and noting that "[t]he most
recent opinion from the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit provides an expla-
nation from Judge Greenberg as to why disparate impact theory should not be
recognized under the ADEA but makes no definite conclusions by which this
Court is bound"). The question of whether "a plaintiff can establish a violation of
the [ADEA] by showing disparate impact alone" has been undecided for some
time. Massarsky v. General Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111, 120 (3d Cir. 1983) (refus-
ing to decide question). District courts in the Third Circuit have regularly allowed
disparate impact claims. See, e.g., Reilly v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 653
F. Supp. 725, 729 (D.N.J. 1987) (analyzing issue and holding that disparate impact
claims are cognizable under ADEA); EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 632 F.
Supp. 343, 370 (E.D. Pa. 1986), rev'd, 907 F.2d 1354 (3d Cir. 1990) (same); EEOC
v. Governor Mifflin Sch. Dist., 623 F. Supp. 734, 741 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (same); Wood-
field v. Heckler, 591 F. Supp. 1390, 1397 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (same); Popko v. City of
Clairton, 570 F. Supp. 446, 451 (W.D. Pa. 1983) (same); Grecco v. Spang & Co.,
527 F. Supp. 978, 980 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (same).
177. Compare Martincic v. Urban Redevelopment Auth., 844 F. Supp. 1073,
1076 (W.D. Pa.) (refusing to recognize disparate impact claim under ADEA), affd
without opinion, 43 F.3d 1461 (3d Cir. 1994), with Maidenbaum v. Bally's Park Place,
Inc., 870 F. Supp. 1254, 1258-59 (D.N.J. 1994) (recognizing disparate impact
under ADEA), affd without opinion, 67 F.3d 291 (3d Cir. 1995).
178. DiBiase, 48 F.3d at 732 (noting that "in the wake of Hazen Paper, it is
doubtful that traditional disparate impact theory is a viable theory of liability under
the ADEA"). Although Judge Greenberg wrote the court's opinion, the other two
judges did not join in this section of the opinion. Id. at 731-32.
179. 870 F. Supp. 1254 (D.N.J. 1994).
180. Id. at 1259. In Maidenbaum, casino employees who had been terminated
in a reduction in force brought age claims on both disparate impact and disparate
treatment grounds. Id. at 1258. The casino modified a layoff system which had
been based solely on seniority, so that employees who were licensed to deal more
than one game were retained over more senior employees who were only licensed
to deal one game. Id. at 1257. The plaintiffs were only licensed to deal one game
and as a result, they were laid off. Id. Plaintiffs alleged that the casino's modifica-
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versy regarding the extension of disparate impact analysis to age cases af-
ter Hazen Paper.18 1 Nevertheless, relying on precedent from courts of
appeals, district courts within the Third Circuit and the New Jersey Appel-
late Division, the court decided that disparate impact liability is cognizable
under the ADEA.182
In contrast, in Martincic v. Urban Redevelopment Authority,183 the United
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania ruled that
disparate impact analysis is not available under the ADEA.1 84 The court
reasoned that the disparate impact model is logically incompatible with
the plaintiffs burden of proving, under the ADEA, that age was a deter-
mining factor in the employment decision. 185 Further, the court con-
tended that Congress's failure to sanction disparate impact in age cases-
after it had sanctioned such claims in Title VII cases-"was not an
oversight."1 8
6
181. Id. at 1258-59. The court did not analyze the argument that disparate
impact liability is logically inconsistent with the Hazen Paper holding, whereby the
ADEA only proscribes decisions made on the basis of age and not decisions based
on factors that correlate with age. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604,
609 (1993). Instead, the court noted that Justice Kennedy's concurrence "casts
some doubt" on the applicability of disparate impact analysis in age cases.
Maidenbaum, 870 F. Supp. at 1258.
182. Maidenbaum, at 1259. The court found that age discrimination claims
under New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination "are governed by the same stan-
dards and burden of proof structures applicable under the ADEA." Id. at 1258
(citing McKenna v. Pacific Rail Serv., 32 F.3d 820 (3d Cir. 1994)). The
Maidenbaum court relied on several cases preceding Hazen Paper which allowed dis-
parate impact claims. Id. at 1259. See Cherchi v. Mobil Oil Corp., 693 F. Supp. 156,
165 (D.NJ.) affd without opinion, 865 F.2d 249 (3d Cir. 1988) (listing cases which
allowed disparate impact); Giammario v. Trenton Bd. of Educ., 497 A.2d 199, 202
(NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (affirming trial court's application of disparate
impact analysis).
183. 844 F. Supp. 1073 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 43 F.3d 1461 (3d Cir. 1994).
184. Id. at 1076-77. In Martincic, the plaintiff alleged that he was denied a
promotion because of his age. Id. at 1074. The court's opinion was in response to
plaintiffs motion in limine to admit a report by a statistical expert. Id. Therefore,
the court's ruling on the availability of disparate impact is dictum.
185. Id. at 1076-78. The court started from the premise that "to violate the
ADEA the accused employer must have thought 'I will discriminate against Doe
because of Doe's age."' Id. at 1077. The court found that intent is a necessary
element of an ADEA violation and "[d] isparate impact... requires no inquiry into
the employer's intent." Id. The court raised an example under which an employer
uses a promotion policy that is solely based on merit, but which results in dispro-
portionate numbers of younger persons being promoted. Id. In this hypothetical,
the plaintiff could make out a prima facie case of age discrimination even if age
was not considered in the promotion decision. Id. The court stated that "[s]urely
this cannot be age discrimination, at least not without Congress's imprimatur." Id.
186. Id. at 1078. The court found the failure to amend the ADEA to be "sig-
nificant." Id. at 1077. The court interpreted Congress's silence as recognition
"that disparate impact simply does not comport with the plaintiff's burden of proof
in ADEA cases." Id. at 1078.
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In DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,1 8 7 Judge Greenberg agreed with
the Martincic court, stating that "in the wake of [Hazen Paper], it is doubtful
that traditional disparate impact theory is a viable theory of liability under
the ADEA."188 Judge Greenberg focused on the incompatibility of the Ha-
zen Paper Court's interpretation of the ADEA and the disparate impact the-
ory. 189 He interpreted Hazen Paper as standing for the proposition that
where an intent to discriminate is not proven, the policies behind the
ADEA are not implicated and there can be no violation.1 90 Judge Green-
berg approved of the Hazen Paper Court's focus on the congressional pur-
pose behind the ADEA. 191 He then distinguished the purposes
underlying the ADEA and Tide VII and found that, while the broad pur-
187. 48 F.3d 719 (3d Cir. 1995).
188. Id. at 732. The weight of this statement is lessened by the fact that the
other two judges who heard the case did not join in this part of the opinion. Id. at
731-32 nn.16-17 (stating thatJudge Becker would not consider cognizability of dis-
parate impact claims under ADEA because there was no disparate impact claim
properly before court and thatJudge McKee considered such a determination un-
necessary in this case). In DiBiase, workers who were terminated in a reduction-in-
force were offered enhanced severance packages in return for a release of all
claims, including ADEA claims, against their former employer. Id. at 722. The
district court partially denied the employer's summary judgment motion on the
grounds that the employer's policy discriminated against older workers because it
required them to relinquish more rights than younger workers in order to receive
the same enhanced benefits package. Id. at 723-24. The Third Circuit reversed
the lower court decision because the plaintiff did not bring forward any evidence
of an intent to discriminate on the part of the defendant and because the plaintiff
did not prove that age was a motivating factor in any of the defendant's decisions.
Id. at 728. The court found that DiBiase did not properly raise a disparate impact
claim. Id. at 731.
189. Id. at 732-33. Judge Greenberg began his analysis by distinguishing lan-
guage in an earlier Third Circuit opinion, MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d
1135 (3d Cir. 1988), as "pure dicta." DiBiase, 48 F.3d at 732 n.18. In MacNamara,
the court stated: "Title VII and ADEA liability can be found where facially neutral
employment policies have a discriminatory effect or 'disparate impact' on pro-
tected groups, without proof that the employer adopted these practices with a dis-
criminatory motive." MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1148. Judge Greenberg found that
the disparate impact claims were only made in relation to race and national origin.
DiBiase, 48 F.3d at 732 n.18. Thus, the court's statement is dicta and is not control-
ling. Id.
190. DiBiase, 48 F.3d at 732. Judge Greenberg highlighted three premises
from Hazen Paper. (1) disparate treatment "'captures the essence of what Congress
sought to prohibit in the ADEA"'; (2) "'Congress's promulgation of the ADEA was
prompted by its concern that older workers were being deprived of employment
on the basis of inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes"'; (3) "'[w]hen the em-
ployer's decision is wholly motivated by factors other than age, the problem of
inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes disappears."' Id. at 732 (quoting Hazen
Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609-10 (1993)). Disparate impact claims, by
definition, do not involve intent to discriminate and therefore, Judge Greenberg
had difficulty seeing how disparate impact theory and the Hazen Paper view of the
ADEA could co-exist. Id. at 732-33.
191. Id. The court found that the statutory language does not provide for
disparate impact claims and stated that interpretations of 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2) as
textual support for disparate impact are "inaccurate." DiBiase, 48 F.3d at 733.
1572 [Vol. 41: p. 1527
46
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 5 [1996], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol41/iss5/5
COMMENT
poses of the latter support disparate impact liability, the more limited pur-
poses of the former do not support such liability.1 92 Judge Greenberg
concluded that application of disparate impact analysis to age claims
"could lead to results which Congress probably did not intend."19 3 The
Greenberg opinion, which is in accord with the reasoning and conclusions
of decisions from the Seventh Circuit and Tenth Circuit, is an indication
that the Third Circuit is likely to join the trend toward rejecting disparate
impact claims under the ADEA.19 4
VI. ANALYSis
As stated above, a search of the text and legislative history of the
ADEA does not clearly indicate whether disparate impact is available. 195
Further, the RFOA defense is not a conclusive bar to disparate impact age
claims. 19 6 As a result, decisions in cases before Hazen Paper were split.
197
The Hazen Paper decision, however, dictates the conclusion that disparate
impact liability is not available under the ADEA.198
192. DiBiase, 48 F.3d at 734. Judge Greenberg found that the rationale which
supported the creation of the disparate impact theory in Griggs was the prohibition
of policies, regardless of their neutral intent, which "froze" a discriminatory status
quo. Id. In Griggs, "'the critical fact was the link between the history of educa-
tional discrimination and the use of that discrimination as a means of presently
disadvantaging African-Americans."' Id. (quoting Hiatt v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 859
F. Supp. 1416, 1436 (D. Wyo. 1994)). Judge Greenberg found that a doctrine
based on these purposes is not easily transplanted into the ADEA, "the primary
purpose of which is to prohibit employers" from acting upon stereotypes of the
elderly. Id.
193. Id. Judge Greenberg referred to work schedules or decisions to elimi-
nate medical insurance as examples of situations where an ADEA plaintiff, under a
disparate impact theory, could force an employer to offer business justifications for
its employment decisions. Id. at 734 n.21. According to Judge Greenberg, Con-
gress probably did not intend such interference with business practices. Id. at 734.
194. Id. at 732-34. Judge Greenberg recognized that his opinion is nonbind-
ing dicta:
I need not go so far as to say that disparate impact is never available
under the ADEA. Rather, resolution of that issue must await another day.
I write this section to highlight my doubts and to say that, at any rate,
disparate impact theory should not be applied as a matter of course.
Id. at 734. For a discussion of the analogous decisions from the Seventh and Tenth
Circuits, see supra notes 151-75 and accompanying text.
195. For a discussion of the text of the ADEA, see supra notes 58-83 and ac-
companying text. For a discussion of the legislative history of the ADEA, see supra
notes 40-57 and accompanying text.
196. For a discussion of the RFOA defense, see supra notes 71-83 and accom-
panying text.
197. For a discussion of the pre-Hazen Paper cases that considered whether
disparate impact was available under the ADEA, see supra notes 97-116 and accom-
panying text.
198. For a discussion of the post-Hazen Paper cases which have rejected dispa-
rate impact, see supra notes 151-75 and accompanying text.
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Analysis of the legislative history of the ADEA does not reveal whether
Congress intended to provide for liability without proof of intent.1 99 The
distinction in the Secretary of Labor's report between "arbitrary discrimi-
nation" and "other factors which adversely affect older workers" suggests
that Congress may have only intended to prohibit disparate treatment.
20 0
This conclusion, however, is weakened when it is considered in light of the
fact that the Supreme Court had not established disparate impact liability
at the time Congress passed the ADEA.20 1
Congress's inclusion of the RFOA defense also does not provide a
clear answer. The RFOA defense has been interpreted as precluding dis-
parate impact analysis under the ADEA.2 0 2 The interpretation of the
RFOA defense, however, as codifying the "business necessity" defense to
disparate impact liability is equally plausible. 20
3
The strongest arguments for extending disparate impact analysis to
the ADEA are based on the similarities between Title VII and the
ADEA.20 4 Tide VII was the impetus for the ADEA, and the substantive
language of the ADEA was derived from Title VII.20 5 Title VII and the
ADEA have similar, though not identical, purposes. 20 6 Therefore, because
disparate impact analysis is available under Tide VII, it might be logical to
extend it to the ADEA.20 7 This argument is greatly weakened, however, by
Congress's 1991 amendments to Title VII and its failure to similarly
amend the ADEA.20 8 Conversely, the language and legislative history of
199. For a discussion of the disparate impact theory, see supra notes 28-37 and
accompanying text.
200. For a discussion of courts and commentators that have found that the
legislative history of the ADEA indicates that Congress did not intend to impose
disparate impact liability, see supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
201. See Kaminshine, supra note 14, at 290-91 (arguing that interpretation of
Secretary's report as rejecting disparate impact is weakened by fact that report
antedated Supreme Court's establishment of disparate impact in Griggs). For a
discussion of the Supreme Court's opinion in Griggs, see supra notes 32-34 and
accompanying text.
202. For a general discussion of the RFOA defense, see supra notes 71-83 and
accompanying text.
203. See EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1080 (7th Cir. 1994)
(Cudahy, J., dissenting) (arguing that RFOA defense was meant to codify business
necessity defense for disparate impact claims). For a discussion of the dissenting
opinion in Parker, see supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
204. For a discussion of the parallels between the ADEA and Title VII, see
supra notes 58-70 and accompanying text.
205. For a discussion of the language of the ADEA and its similarities to Title
VII, see supra notes 58-70 and accompanying text.
206. For a discussion of the purposes of Title VII and the ADEA, see supra
note 68 and accompanying text.
207. For a discussion of the courts and commentators which have extended
the disparate impact theory to ADEA claims on this reasoning, see supra note 69
and accompanying text.
208. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1994)) (amending Title VII to provide for disparate
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the ADEA cannot be viewed as a conclusive bar to disparate impact analy-
sis under the statute.
The Hazen Paper decision does, however, preclude disparate impact
analysis under the ADEA.2 0 9 The Hazen Paper Court held that only deci-
sions based on age are prohibited by the ADEA.21 0 Decisions based on
any other factor, regardless of the correlation between that factor and age,
do not involve "inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes" and thus do not
violate the ADEA.2 11 By definition, disparate impact analysis involves poli-
cies that are facially neutral.2 1 2 The Hazen Paper Court held that such poli-
cies do not violate the ADEA.21 3 Any other argument is unavailing.
The reasoning of the Parker and Ellis courts on this point is sound.2 1 4
Both courts rely on the legislative history, statutory language and the dif-
ferences between Title VII and the ADEA to support the rejection of dispa-
rate impact.21 5 Their conclusions, however, could have been adequately
supported by reference to Hazen Paper and the logical inconsistency of its
holding and the disparate impact theory.
VII. RECOMMENDATION
The scope of the ADEA's protection for older workers is seriously lim-
ited by the decisions in Hazen Paper, Parker and Ellis.2 16 Judge Cudahy's
dissenting opinion in Parker correctly points out that the result of this ap-
proach is that a plaintiff is required to produce "smoking gun" evidence of
impact). For a discussion of the amendment of Title VII, see supra notes 89-95 and
accompanying text.
209. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993). While the court
stated: "we have never decided whether a disparate impact theory of liability is
available under the ADEA, and we do not do so here," the Court's reasoning pre-
cludes disparate impact claims. Id. at 610.
210. For a detailed discussion of the holding in Hazen Paper, see supra notes
117-28 and accompanying text.
211. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 611.
212. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (imposing
liability because of disparate impact of employer's facially neutral policy). If an
employer's policy overfly discriminated on the basis of age, the employer would be
liable for disparate treatment under the ADEA. See generally Hazen Paper, 507 U.S.
at 609-10. For a general discussion of the disparate impact and disparate treat-
ment doctrines, see supra notes 28-37 and accompanying text.
213. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 611-13. For a detailed discussion of the Hazen
Paper decision, see supra notes 117-28 and accompanying text.
214. For a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's decision in Parker, see supra
notes 151-62 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Tenth Circuit's deci-
sion in Ellis, see supra notes 163-75 and accompanying text.
215. See Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999, 1007-08 (finding that text
and legislative history of ADEA indicate that Congress did not provide for dispa-
rate impact liability); EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir.
1994) (same).
216. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 604 (holding that employer's decision motivated
by factors other than age, which have high correlation with age, does not violate
ADEA); Ellis, 73 F.3d at 999 (rejecting use of disparate impact analysis under
ADEA); Parker, 41 F.3d at 1073 (same).
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discriminatory animus.21 7 When these opinions are considered in light of
the Supreme Court's opinion in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,2 18 which
requires that a disparate treatment plaintiff show not only that an em-
ployer's proffered reason for its employment action is false, but also that
the true reason is discriminatory, the deck is heavily stacked against an age
discrimination plaintiff.2 19 When one considers the plight of older work-
ers in the current economy, it would appear that there is a need for
greater, not less, protection. 22 0 These shortcomings of the stautory
scheme, however, should be addressed by Congress, not by the courts.22 1
When a facially neutral employment policy disadvantages older work-
ers as a group, there is at least a possibility that the employer unfairly
targeted older workers. If disparate impact is not a part of the ADEA, a
plaintiff cannot challenge the employer's policy without evidence of dis-
criminatory intent. Such evidence is extremely rare. If a plaintiff can
identify an employment policy and establish that the policy had a statisti-
cally disproportionate effect on older workers, disparate impact analysis
requires the employer to justify its challenged policy as job-related and
consistent with business necessity.
While the cost of proving that neutral policies are 'job-related and
consistent with business necessity" is admittedly high, this is a fair way of
striking a balance between the competing interests of employers and em-
ployees. The business necessity defense is an effective protection against
the improper imposition of liability in Title VII disparate impact claims.
Congress has already decided that such costs are justified in the Title VII
context because the costs are outweighed by the benefits of more effective
217. Parker, 41 F.3d at 1080 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). Courts have long recog-
nized that direct evidence of discriminatory motive or animus is often not avail-
able. See Robert J. Gregory, There Is Life in that Old (I Mean, More "Senior") Dog Yet:
The Age-Proxy Theory After Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 11 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 391, 423
& n.171 (1994) (finding that "it is difficult to prove employer motivation" and
listing cases that have recognized this difficulty).
218. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
219. Id. at 507-08. The Court adopted the "pretext-plus" approach to dispa-
rate treatment claims, under which a plaintiff must show not only that an em-
ployer's reasons for an adverse employment decision are pretextual, but also that
the real reasons are discriminatory. Id. For a discussion of Hicks and the burdens
of proof in a disparate treatement case, see supra note 30.
220. For a discussion of the massive numbers of layoffs in recent years and the
particular effect of those layoffs on workers who are over forty years-old, see supra
note 13 and accompanying text.
221. See Sloan, supra note 94, at 509 (asserting that dispute over availability of
disparate impact "is fundamentally a policy dispute about the definition of age
discrimination and the appropriate scope of the ADEA"); see also Pontz, supra note
16, at 271 (concluding that congressional action would be required to make dispa-
rate impact analysis available in age claims); Gilbert M. Roman, Courts Tossing Out
More Disparate Impact' Claims, RocKy MOUNTAIN NEWS, Feb. 11, 1996, at 3 (report-
ing on recent cases which rejected use of disparate impact theory in age cases and
urging readers to write to their congressional representatives).
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enforcement of antidiscrimination laws. This judgment should also apply
in the ADEA context.
Congress should amend the ADEA to specifically provide for dispa-
rate impact analysis, just as it amended Title VII.2 2 2 The amendment
should set out the burdens of proof and applicable defenses for an ADEA
disparate impact claim. Such an amendment would provide older workers
with greater protection from discriminatory age-based policies.
From the employer's perspective, the "business necessity" defense
provides significant protection against unwarranted liability. Authoriza-
tion of disparate impact analysis under the ADEA would not create a sig-
nificant risk of imposition of liability in situations where an employer's
policies are based on legitimate, nondiscriminatory business reasons. This
risk is certainly no greater in the ADEA context than it is in the Title VII
context. From the employee's perspective, older employees need all the
protection they can get.
Brendan Sweeney
222. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (amend-
ing Title VII to provide for disparate impact). An amendment to the ADEA would
be based on this language.
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